Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

12-2017

Static Analysis of Android Apps with Text Analysis and Bidirectional Propagation
Jianjun Huang
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations

Recommended Citation
Huang, Jianjun, "Static Analysis of Android Apps with Text Analysis and Bi-directional Propagation"
(2017). Open Access Dissertations. 1567.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/1567

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries.
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

STATIC ANALYSIS OF ANDROID APPS WITH TEXT ANALYSIS AND
BI-DIRECTIONAL PROPAGATION

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Purdue University
by
Jianjun Huang

In Partial Fulfllment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

December 2017
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana

ii

THE PURDUE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL
STATEMENT OF DISSERTATION APPROVAL

Dr. Xiangyu Zhang, Chair
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University
Dr. Ninghui Li
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University
Dr. Vernon J. Rego
Department of Computer Science, Purdue University
Dr. Lin Tan
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo

Approved by:
Dr. Voicu S. Popescu by Dr. William J. Gorman
Head of the School Graduate Program

iii

This work is dedicated to my wife Jie Zhang.

水过竞千帆，遥遥汪洋叹。
屈指昼夜轮，多少日月转。
文章千古事，史载三两篇。
回首明镜里，仍是旧时颜。
我取昆仑胆，谢氏堂前燕。
张眼睥天下，捷书先流传。

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to express my special appreciation and deepest gratitude
to my advisor, Professor Xiangyu Zhang. I would like to thank him for his extraordinary
guidance, encouragement and patience during my whole PhD study. He provided me the
freedom to work on topics I was interested in. When I got stuck, he was always there to help
and made sure I was headed in the right direction. He stayed up late at night with me for
submission deadlines. He polished all my writings and provided me valuable suggestions
for improving my professional writing skills. He took the time from his busy schedule and
helped me to get prepared for presentations and job talks. I am so fortunate to have him as
my advisor.
I would like to sincerely thank Professor Lin Tan. She guided me in the research of text
analysis. I would also like to thank Professor Ninghui Li and Professor Vernon Rego for
their time and efforts to serve on my PhD committee. I thank them for all of their valuable
inputs and suggestions. I also thank Professor Tiark Rompf, Professor Hubert Dunsmore,
and Professor Bharat Bhargava for serving on my qualifying/preliminary exam committee
and their suggestions.
I would like to thank Dr. Zhichun Li and Dr. Zhenyu Wu in NEC Labs, Dr. Xusheng
Xiao in Case Western Reserve University, and Dr. Chen Tian in Huawei for their helps
during my intern and efforts on my research and paper writing.
I would like to extend my thanks to the research group members, Dr. Yunhui Zheng,
Dr. Tao Bao, Dr. Peng Liu, Dr. Yousra Aafer, Yonghwi Kwon, Weihang Wang and Shiqing
Ma for their kind discussions and helps in both research and real life.
Finally, I would also thank my parents, Shaoyan Huang and Maoxiu Li, and my wife,
Jie Zhang, for their love, support and encouragement. Without them, this dissertation could
not have happened.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . .
1.1 Thesis Statement . . . . .
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . .
1.3 Dissertation Organization

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

1
2
3
4

2 SUPOR: PRECISE AND SCALABLE SENSITIVE USER INPUT DETECTION
FOR ANDROID APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Background and Motivation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Necessary Support for Static Sensitive User Input Identifcation . .
2.2.2 Android UI Rendering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.3 UI Sensitiveness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.4 Natural Language Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Design of SUPOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 Layout Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.4 UI Sensitiveness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.5 Variable Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.6 Keyword Dataset Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5 Evaluations and Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.1 Evaluation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.2 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.3 Effectiveness of UI Sensitiveness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.4 Accuracy of Detecting Sensitive User Input Disclosures . . . . . .
2.5.5 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

5
5
9
9
11
13
15
16
16
16
17
19
23
24
26
29
29
30
31
35
37
40
41
43

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

vi
Page
3 BIDTEXT: DETECTING SENSITIVE DATA DISCLOSURE VIA BI-DIRECTIONAL
TEXT CORRELATION ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Motivating Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 Language Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.2 Type System and Bi-directional Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.3 Practical Enhancements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.4 Disclosure Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.1 Pilot Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.2 Unifcation vs. Bi-directional Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.3 Large Scale Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4 ASDROID: DETECTING STEALTHY BEHAVIORS IN ANDROID APPLICATIONS BY USER INTERFACE AND PROGRAM BEHAVIOR CONTRADICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Motivating Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Intent Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 UI Compatibility Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 80
. 80
. 83
. 86
. 88
. 95
. 99
104
107
107
109

5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

2.1

UI features in different mobile OSes.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.2

Scores of the text labels in Figure 2.8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.3

Part of keyword dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2.4

Statistics of 16,000 apps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

2.5

UI analysis details for 20 randomly chosen apps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3.1

Manually inspected evaluation results for 100 apps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4.1

Experiment results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

2.1

Example sensitive user inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.2

Simplifed layout fle login_activity.xml. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.3

Simplifed activity example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

2.4

Parse tree of an example sentence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2.5

Overview of SUPOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2.6

UI model for Figure 2.1 on 480x800 screen. Only the ID, relative coordinates
and text of the widgets are presented here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2.7

The partition of the UI is based on the boundary of the input feld. . . . . . . . . 21

2.8

Example for UI widget sensitiveness analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.9

False positive example in UI sensitiveness analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

2.10 True positives and false positives by source/sink categories for the reported apps. 36
2.11 Case study: National ID and password disclosure example without protection. . 37
2.12 Case study: Credit card information disclosure example.
2.13 Case study: Health information disclosure.

. . . . . . . . . . . . 38

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.1

Motivating example from app com.buycott.android. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

3.2

Data fow (solid arrows) and type propagation (dashed arrows) for Figure 3.1. . . 48

3.3

Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3.4

Bi-directional propagation rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.5

App com.mojo.animewallpaper: code example and bi-directional propagation
for f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3.6

Abstraction and propagation rules for check-and-alert cases. . . . . . . . . . . . 59

3.7

Propagation graph for a simple string concatenation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.8

Propagation rules for string concatenation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.9

Computing abstract strings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

ix
Figure

Page

3.10 Distribution of accumulative analysis time for all apps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.11 Distribution for the analysis time (in minutes) of the apps reported with sensitive data disclosures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.12 Breakdown of the reported apps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.13 Comparing B ID T EXT with static tainting (tracking specifc APIs) and SUPOR [59]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.14 Length distribution of the emitted paths for the reported apps. X-axis shows
the length of the paths. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1

Simplifed code snippet for app Qiyu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

4.2

Call graph and intent propagation in app Qiyu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

4.3

Datalog atoms for intent propagation and correlation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

4.4

Datalog rules for intent propagation and correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

4.5

ICC call chain example in app GoldDream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4.6

Intent correlation example in app Shanghai 1930. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

4.7

The keyword cover set for the SendSms intent. The y-axis denotes the percentage of top level functions that can be uniquely covered by a keyword (pair).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

4.8

Breakdown of the top level functions with intents. Activity lifecycle methods
include onCreate() and onStart() of an activity. onReceive() and
the other categories do not have associated UI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4.9

Analysis time. The detection results are also annotated on top of each bar
with ‘@’ denoting true positive(red), ‘X’ false positive(black) and ‘N’ false
negative( yellow). Since an app may have multiple intents, it may be annotated
with multiple labels. The last 3 apps exceeded the max timeout 30 mins. . . . 103

4.10 Code example in app iCalendar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.11 Code example in app HitPP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

x

ABBREVIATIONS
API

Application Program Interface

JSON

JavaScript Object Notation

UI

User Interface

GUI

Graphical User Interface

URL

Uniform Resource Locator

WALA

T. J. Watson Libraries for Analysis

APK

Android Package Kit

DEX

Dalvik Executable Format

ICC

Inter-Component Communication

SDK

Software Development Kit

ADT

Android Development Tools

SMS

Short Message Service

IR

Intermediate Representation

SSA

Static Single Assignment

IMEI

International Mobile Equipment Identity

NLP

Natural Language Processing

APP

(Android) Application

WYSIWYG

What You See Is What You Get

IDE

Integrated Development Environment

LHS

Left Hand Side

RHS

Right Hand Side

FP

False Positive

TP

True Positive

FN

False Negative

xi

ABSTRACT
Huang, Jianjun PhD, Purdue University, December 2017. Static Analysis of Android Apps
with Text Analysis and Bi-directional Propagation. Major Professor: Xiangyu Zhang.
While smartphones and mobile apps have been an integral part of our life, personal
security issues on smartphones become a serious concern. Privacy leakage, namely sensitive data disclosures, happens frequently in mobile apps to disclose the user’s sensitive
information to untrusted, even malicious, third-party service providers, leading to serious
problems. Besides, stealthy behaviors that are performed without the user’s acknowledgment may cause unexpected phone charges or leakage of sensitive information.
To address these problems, many approaches have been proposed. However, previous
mobile privacy related research efforts have largely focused on predefned known sources
managed by smartphones. More specifcally, they focus on the API functions that directly
return sensitive values. Some other information sources, such as the user inputs through
user interface and data obtained from network or fles, have been mostly neglected, even
though such sources may contain a lot of sensitive information. In addition, the research
efforts on detecting stealthy behaviors also depend on identifying suspicious behaviors with
known actions, e.g., known premium phone numbers or URLs of malicious websites.
In this dissertation, we present two automated techniques for the purpose of comprehensively sensitive data disclosure detection. Moreover, we propose a novel technique to
detect stealthy behaviors in Android apps.
Firstly, we examine the possibility of scalably detecting sensitive user inputs from mobile apps. We design and implement SUPOR, a novel static analysis tool that automatically examines the user interface to identify sensitive user inputs containing critical user
data, such as user credentials, fnance and medical data. SUPOR mimics from the user’s
perspective to associate input felds in user interfaces with most correlated text labels and

xii
utilizes text analysis to determine the sensitiveness of the user inputs. With the knowledge
of sensitive user inputs, we are then able to detect their disclosures with the help of taint
analysis.
Secondly, we develop B ID T EXT to address the issues of detecting sensitive data disclosures where the data is generated by generic API functions whose return values cannot be
easily recognized as sensitive or insensitive. B ID T EXT leverages the context of the data,
associates the correlated text labels to corresponding variables and then applies text analysis to determine the sensitiveness of the data held by the variables. The intuition here is
that the context of programs contains useful information to indicate what the variables may
hold. B ID T EXT also features a novel bi-directional propagation technique through forward
and backward data-fow to enhance static sensitive data disclosure detection.
Thirdly, we develop AsDroid to detect stealthy behaviors in Android apps by checking
the contradiction between user expectation, which is represented by user interface, and
program behavior that can be abstracted by API invocations. We model API invocations
with different types of intents and backwardly propagate the intents to top level functions,
e.g., a user interaction function. We then analyze the text extracted from the user interface
component associated with the top level function. Semantic mismatch of the two indicates
stealthy behavior.
To sum up, in this dissertation, we present SUPOR to detect sensitive user inputs, and
B ID T EXT to determine the sensitiveness of the data generated by generic API functions.
We also propose bi-directional propagation to enhance sensitive data disclosure detection.
In addition, we inspect the contradiction between program behaviors and user expectations
to detect stealthy behaviors in Android apps.

1

1 INTRODUCTION
While smartphones and mobile apps have been an essential part of our life, personal security issues on smartphones, including privacy and malicious behaviors, become a serious
concern.
Privacy Issues. Previous mobile privacy related research efforts have largely focused
on predefned known sources managed by smartphones. More specifcally, they focus on
the API functions that return sensitive values, such as device identifers (phone number,
IMEI, etc.), location, contact, calendar, browser state, most of which are permission protected. although these data sources are very important, they do not cover all sensitive data
related to users’ privacy.
A major type of sensitive data that has been largely neglected is the sensitive user input,
which refers to the sensitive information entered by users via the user interface. Many
mobile apps today acquire sensitive credentials, fnancial, health, and medical information
from users through the user interfaces. While all kinds of user inputs, either sensitive or
insensitive are retrieved in the code via the same API functions, traditional sensitive data
disclosure detection techniques that require predefned data sources are not enough because
they lack mechanism of deciding the sensitiveness of those API returns. In the context of
static detection of mobile apps, prior to performing sensitive data disclosure detection, we
must resolve the challenges of discovering the input felds from an app’s user interface,
identifying which input felds are sensitive and associating the sensitive input felds to the
corresponding variables in the code.
On the other hand, existing techniques require the data sensitiveness of the sources to
be known before the static detection is conducted. Even the above problem is related to determine the data sensitiveness based on where the data is produced. With the knowledge of
sensitiveness at the source points, a forward data fow needs to be observed between sources
and sinks in order to report a disclosure defect. However, some generic API functions may
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return sensitive values, depending on the context, although they may return insensitive values in many cases, and we have no way to understand the data sensitiveness from where
the data is generated. For example, a local fle or the network response may contain sensitive values but given the fle or the network request, we cannot claim the sensitiveness
of the response. In such cases, most existing approaches would not work properly. We
cannot simply treat the generic API functions as the sensitive data sources as that will lead
to a large number of false warnings, or just ignore all of such cases because we can expect
missing warnings. In addition, forward data fow analysis is insuffcient. In many cases,
a piece of data may be frst emitted through a sink and then later recognized as sensitive
somehow.
Stealthy Behaviors. Detecting malicious behaviors, especially stealthy behaviors, are
also a hot research topic. Existing techniques mainly depends on identifying certain known
fngerprints of the malicious operations in Android apps. For example, if an app contains
directly making phone calls or sending short messages to a known premium numbers, or
accessing a URL of known malicious website, the app will be reported as malware. More
sophisticated cases cannot be detected. For instance, adversaries may obfuscate the numbers or URLs in the code such that static analysis is not able to understand whether the
numbers or URLs are blacklisted. Besides, maintaining a blacklist of the numbers and
URLs are not trivial. In some countries, the premium numbers are the same as normal
phone numbers. They can also be actively changed to avoid the blacklist detection. Since
the code behaviors, represented by API invocations, of malicious actions and benign operations are the same, we cannot report malicious behaviors by only inspecting the API calls
when we do not know whether the destinations are good or bad.

1.1 Thesis Statement
This dissertation addresses the important issue on the detection of sensitive data disclosures in mobile apps by presenting two approaches. First, it proposes SUPOR, a static
technique that can automatically, scalably and precisely detect the data sensitiveness of user
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inputs from user interfaces. Second, it introduces B ID T EXT, a technique that can recognize the sensitiveness of data generated from even more generic API functions, such as data
from network or fles. The dissertation also presents AsDroid to detect stealthy behaviors
in Android apps.
The thesis statement is as follows: Existing privacy related techniques that have mostly
focused on predefned sensitive data sources are not enough to detect sensitive data disclosures, when the data generated by some generic API functions (such as reading data from
user interface, fles, network and so on) are neglected; and utilizing maliciously known destinations to detect stealthy behaviors is not suffcient. Proposing an automated technique
to identify the sensitiveness of user inputs can help the detectors discover the sensitive
user input disclosure problems. Introducing the bi-directional text correlation analysis can
handle even more cases in which the data sensitiveness cannot be determined at the data
generation points. Combining code behavior analysis and user interface analysis can tell
whether certain program behaviors contradict the user expectation, namely, whether they
are stealthy behaviors.

1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
• We propose SUPOR, a static technique that can automatically, scalably and precisely
determine the data sensitiveness of user inputs in Android apps. SUPOR achieves the
following three challenging goals: (1) it systematically discovers the input felds from
an app’s UI; (2) identifes which input felds are sensitive by associating the input
felds with mostly correlated text labels and performing text analysis to determine
whether the user inputs contain sensitive data; (3) and associates the sensitive input
felds to the corresponding variables in the apps that store their values.
• We design and develop a novel technique, B ID T EXT, to statically detect sensitive
data disclosures in Android apps while the data can be generated from more generic
API functions like reading from fles or network. Since the data sensitiveness of
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such generic API functions cannot be determined from the defnition locations, we
address the challenges by typing the correlated text labels to corresponding variables
and propagating them bi-directionally along forward and backward data-fow. The
problem is formalized in a type system and we have obtained some preliminary results for the prototype we implement.
• We present AsDroid to statically detect stealthy behaviors in Android apps without
the knowledge of maliciously destinations like premium numbers, malicious URLs.
We resolve the problem by inspecting the contradiction between user expectation and
program behaviors. The former one can be abstracted from the user interface and the
latter one is represented by API invocations. We propagate the intents of API calls
to top level functions and then check if they mismatch with what the associated user
interface indicates. The analysis is formalized by datalog rules.

1.3 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses the design, implementation and evaluation of SUPOR. Chapter 3
details the problem of detecting sensitive data disclosures for generic data and how we
solve the problem through bi-directional text correlation analysis. Chapter 4 talks about
the motivation, design and evaluation of AsDroid to detect stealthy behaviors.
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2 SUPOR: PRECISE AND SCALABLE SENSITIVE USER INPUT DETECTION
FOR ANDROID APPLICATIONS
While smartphones and mobile apps have been an essential part of our life, privacy is
a serious concern. Previous mobile privacy related research efforts have largely focused
on predefned known sources managed by smartphones. Sensitive user inputs through UI
(User Interface), another information source that may contain a lot of sensitive information,
have been mostly neglected.
In this section, we examine the possibility of scalably detecting sensitive user inputs
from mobile apps. In particular, we design and implement SUPOR, a novel static analysis
tool that automatically examines the UIs to identify sensitive user inputs containing critical
user data, such as user credentials, fnance, and medical data. SUPOR enables existing privacy analysis approaches to be applied on sensitive user inputs as well. To demonstrate the
usefulness of SUPOR, we build a system that detects privacy disclosures of sensitive user
inputs by combining SUPOR with off-the-shelf static taint analysis. We apply the system
to 16,000 popular Android apps, and conduct a measurement study on the privacy disclosures. SUPOR achieves an average precision of 97.3% and an average recall of 97.3%
for sensitive user input identifcation. SUPOR fnds 355 apps with privacy disclosures
and the false positive rate is 8.7%. We discover interesting cases related to national ID,
username/password, credit card and health information.

2.1 Introduction
Smartphones have become the dominant kind of end-user devices with more units sold
than traditional PCs. With the ever-increasing number of apps, smartphones are becoming
capable of handling all kinds of needs from users, and gain more and more access to sen-
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User ID

I

Password

I

Figure 2.1.: Example sensitive user inputs.

sitive and private personal data. Despite the capabilities to meet users’ needs, data privacy
in smartphones becomes a major concern.
Previous research on smartphone privacy protection primarily focuses on sensitive data
managed by the phone OS and framework APIs, such as device identifers (phone number,
IMEI, etc.), location, contact, calendar, browser state, most of which are permission protected. Although these data sources are very important, they do not cover all sensitive data
related to users’ privacy. A major type of sensitive data that has been largely neglected are
the sensitive user inputs, which refers to the sensitive information entered by users via the
User Interface (UI). Many apps today acquire sensitive credentials, fnancial, health, and
medical information from users through the UI. Therefore, to protect and respect users’
privacy, apps must handle sensitive user inputs in a secure manner that matches with users’
trust and expectations.
Figure 2.1 shows an example interface an app uses to acquire users’ login credentials
via input felds rendered in the UI. When users click the button “Login”, the app use the user
ID and password to authenticate with a remote service. As the developers may be unaware
of the potential risk on the disclosures of such sensitive information, the login credentials
are sent in plain text over an insecure channel (HTTP), which inadvertently compromises
users’ privacy.
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In this section, we propose SUPOR (Sensitive User inPut detectOR), a static mobile
app analysis tool for detecting sensitive user inputs and identifying their associated variables in the app code as sensitive information sources. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the frst to study scalable detection of sensitive user inputs on smartphone platforms.
Previously, there are many existing research efforts [1–9] on studying the privacy related topics on predefned sensitive data sources on the phone. Our approach enables those
existing efforts to be applied to sensitive user inputs as well. For example, with proper static
or dynamic taint analysis, one can track the privacy disclosures of sensitive user inputs to
different sinks. With static program analysis, one can also identify the vulnerabilities in
the apps that may unintentionally disclosure such sensitive user inputs to public or to the
attacker controlled output. One could also study how sensitive user inputs propagate to
third-party advertisement libraries, etc.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our approach, we combine SUPOR with off-the-shelf
static taint analysis to detect privacy disclosures of sensitive user inputs.
The major challenges of identifying sensitive user inputs are the following:
(i) How to systematically discover the input felds from an app’s UI?
(ii) How to identify which input felds are sensitive?
(iii) How to associate the sensitive input felds to the corresponding variables in the apps
that store their values?
In order to detect sensitive user inputs scalably, static UI analysis is much appealing,
because it is very diffcult to generate test inputs to trigger all the UI screens in an app
in a scalable way. For example, an app might require login, which is diffcult for tools to
generate desirable inputs and existing approaches usually require human intervention [10].
On the other hand, it is also extremely challenging to launch static analysis to answer the
aforementioned three questions for general desktop applications.
To this end, we have studied major mobile OSes, such as Android, iOS and Windows
Phone systems, and made a few important observations. Then, we implement SUPOR for
Android since it is most popular.
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First, we fnd all these mobile OSes provide a standard rapid UI development kit as part
of the development framework, and most apps use such a homogeneous UI framework to
develop apps. Such UI framework usually leverages a declarative language, such as XML
based layout languages, to describe the UI layout, which enables us to statically discover
the input felds on the UI.
Second, in order to identify which input felds are sensitive, we have to be able to
render the UI, because the rendered UI screens contain important texts as hints that guide
users to enter their inputs, which can be used to identify whether the inputs are sensitive.
For instance, in Figure 2.1, the text “User ID” describes the nature of the frst input feld.
Statically rendering UI screens is generally very hard for arbitrary desktop applications.
However, with help of WYSIWYG (What You See is What You Get) layout editing feature
from the rapid UI development kits of mobile OSes, we are able to statically render the UI
for most mobile apps in order to associate the descriptive text labels with the corresponding
input felds. Furthermore, due to the relatively small screen size of smartphones, most text
labels are concise. As such, current NLP (Natural Language processing) techniques can
achieve high accuracy on identifying sensitive terms.
Third, all mobile OSes provide APIs to load the UI layouts made by rapid UI development kits and to bind with the app code. Such a binding mechanism provides us opportunities to infer the relationship between the sensitive input felds from UI layouts to the
variables in the app code that store their values.
Our work makes three major contributions:
First, we devise a UI sensitiveness analysis that identifes the input felds that may
accept sensitive information by leveraging UI rendering, geometrical layout analysis and
NLP techniques. We modify the static rendering engine from the ADT (Android Developer
Tools), so that the static rendering can be done with an APK binary instead of source code,
and accurately identify the coordinates of text labels and input felds. Then, based on the
insight that users typically read the text label physically close to the input feld in the screen
for understanding the purpose of the input feld, we design an algorithm to fnd the optimal descriptive text label for each input feld. We further leverage NLP (nature language
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processing) techniques [11–14] to select and map popular keywords extracted from the UIs
of a massive number of apps to important sensitive categories, and use these keywords to
classify the sensitive text labels and identify sensitive input felds. Our evaluation shows
that SUPOR achieves an average precision of 97.3% and an average recall of 97.3% for
sensitive user inputs detection.
Second, we design a context-sensitive approach to associate sensitive UI input felds
to the corresponding variables in the app code. Instances of sensitive input widgets in the
app code can be located using our UI analysis results in a context-insensitive fashion (i.e.
based on widget IDs). We further reduce false positives by adding context-sensitivity, i.e.
we leverage backward slicing and identify each input widget’s residing layout by tracing
back to the closest layout loading function. Only if both widget and layout identifers
match with the sensitive input feld in the XML layout, we consider the widget instance is
associated with the sensitive input feld.
Finally, we implement a privacy disclosure detection system based on SUPOR and
static taint analysis, and apply the system to 16,000 popular free Android apps collected
from the Offcial Android Market (Google Play). The system can process 11.1 apps per
minute on an eight-server cluster. Among all these apps, 355 apps are detected with sensitive user input disclosures. Our manual validation on these suspicious apps shows an
overall detection accuracy of 91.3%. In addition, we conduct detailed case studies on the
apps we discovered, and show interesting cases of unsafe disclosures of users’ national IDs,
credentials, credit card and health related information.

2.2 Background and Motivation Example
In this section, we provide background on sensitive user input identifcation.

2.2.1 Necessary Support for Static Sensitive User Input Identifcation
Modern mobile OSes, such as Android, iOS and Windows Phone system, provide
frameworks and tools for rapid UI design. They usually provide a large collection of stan-
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dard UI widgets, and different layouts to compose the widgets together. They also provide
a declarative language, such as XML, to let the developer describe their UI designs, and
further provide GUI support for WYSIWYG UI design tools. In order to design a static
analysis tool for sensitive user input identifcation, we need four basic supporting features.
The rapid UI development design in modern mobile OSes makes it feasible to achieve such
features.
A: statically identify the input felds and text labels;
B: statically identify the attributes of input felds;
C: statically render the UI layout without launching the app;
D: statically map the input felds defned in the UI layouts to the app code.
These four features are necessary to statically identify the sensitive input felds on UIs.
In order to infer the semantic meaning of an input feld and decide whether it is sensitive,
we need (i) the attributes of the input feld; (ii) the surrounding descriptive text labels on
the UI. Some attributes of the input felds can help us quickly understand its semantics and
sensitiveness. For example, if the input type is password, we know this is a passwordlike input feld. However, in many cases, the attributes alone are not enough to decide
the semantics and sensitiveness of the input felds. In those cases, we have to rely on UI
analysis. A well-designed app has to allow the user to easily identify the relevant texts for
a particular input feld and provide appropriate inputs based on his understanding of the
meaning of texts. Based on the above observation, we need Feature C to render the UI and
obtain the coordinates of input felds and text labels, so that we can associate them and
further reason about the sensitiveness of input felds. Once we identify the sensitive input
felds, we have to fnd the variable in the app code used to store the values of the input feld
for further analysis.
We have studied Android, iOS and Windows Phone systems. As shown in Table 2.1,
all mobile OSes provide standard formats for storing app UI layouts that we can use to
achieve features A and B. All of them have IDEs that can statically render UI layouts for
the WYSIWYG UI design. If we reuse this functionality we can achieve static rendering
(feature C). Furthermore, all of them provide APIs for developers to map the widgets in
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Table 2.1.: UI features in different mobile OSes.

1

Android

iOS

Windows Phone

Layout format

XML

NIB / XIB / Storyboard

XAML/HTML

Static UI render

ADT

Xcode

Visual Studio

APIs map widgets to code

Yes

Yes

Yes

<LinearLayout android:orientation="vertical">

2

<TextView android:text="@string/tip_uid" />

3

<EditText android:id="@+id/uid" />

4

<TextView android:text="@string/tip_pwd" />

5

<EditText android:id="@+id/pwd"
android:inputType="textPassword" />

6

<Button android:id="@+id/login"
android:text="@string/tip_login"/>

7

</LinearLayout>

Figure 2.2.: Simplifed layout fle login_activity.xml.

layouts to the variables in the app code that hold the user inputs. Combined with static
program analysis to understand the mapping, we will be able to achieve feature D.

2.2.2 Android UI Rendering
For proof of concept, the current SUPOR is designed for the Android platform. An Android app usually consists of multiple activities. Each activity provides a window to draw
a UI. A UI is defned by a layout, which specifes the dimension, spacing, and placement
of the content within the window. The layout consists of various interactive UI widgets
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1 public class LoginActivity extends Activity implements

View.OnClickListener {
2

private EditText txtUid, txtPwd;

3

private Button btnReset;

4

protected void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {

5

super.onCreate(bundle);

6

setContentView(R.layout.login_activity);

7

txtUid = (EditText) findViewById(R.id.uid);

8

txtPwd = (EditText) findViewById(R.id.pwd);

9

btnLogin = (Button) findViewById(R.id.login);

10

btnLogin.setOnClickListener(this);

11

}

12

public void onClick(View view) {

13

String uid = txtUid.getText().toString();

14

String pwd = txtPwd.getText().toString();

15

String url = "http://www.plxx.com/Users/" + "login?uid=" +
uid + "&pwd=" + pwd;

16

HttpClient c = new DefaultHttpClient();

17

HttpGet g = new HttpGet(url);

18

Object o = c.execute(g, new BasicResponseHandler());

19

// following operations are omitted

20

}

21 }

Figure 2.3.: Simplifed activity example.

(e.g., input felds and buttons) as well as layout models (e.g., linear or relative layout) that
describe how to arrange UI widgets.
At run time, when a layout fle is loaded, the Android framework parses the layout fle
and determines how to render the UI widgets in the window by checking the layout models
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and the relevant attributes of the UI widgets. At the mean time, all UI widgets in the layout
are instantiated and then can be referenced in the code.
An example layout in XML is presented in Figure 2.2 and the code snippet of the corresponding activity is shown in Figure 2.3. This layout includes fve UI widgets: two text labels (TextView), two input felds (EditText) and a button. They are aligned vertically
based on the LinearLayout at Line 1. The frst text label shows “User ID” based on
the attribute android:text=“@string/tip_uid”, which indicates a string stored
as a resource with the ID tip_uid. The type attribute of the second input feld is android:inputType=“textPassword”, indicating that it is designed for accepting a
password, which conceals the input after the users enter it. Instead of explicitly placing text
labels as in Figure 2.2, some developers decorate an input feld with a hint attribute, which
specifes a message that will be displayed when the input is empty. For instance, developers may choose to display “User ID” and “Password” inside the corresponding input felds
using the hint attribute.
Figure 2.1 shows the rendered UI for the layout in Figure 2.2. The layout including
all the inner widgets is loaded into the screen by calling setContentView() at Line 6
in Figure 2.3. The argument of setContentView() specifes the reference ID of the
layout resource. Similarly, a runtime instance of a widget can also be located through a
findViewById() call with the appropriate reference ID. For example, the reference ID
R.id.uid is used to obtain a runtime instance of the input feld at Line 7 in Figure 2.3.

2.2.3 UI Sensitiveness Analysis
Existing techniques usually consider permission protected framework APIs as the predefned sensitive data sources. However, generic framework APIs, such as getText(),
can also obtain sensitive data from the user inputs. To precisely detect these sensitive
sources, we need to determine which GUI input widgets are sensitive.
Two kinds of information are useful for this purpose. First, certain attributes of the widgets can be a good indicator about whether the input is sensitive. Using the inputType
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Figure 2.4.: Parse tree of an example sentence.

attribute with a value “textPassword”, we can directly identify password felds. However,
not all sensitive input felds use this attribute value. The hint attributes also may contain
useful descriptive texts that may indicate the sensitiveness of the input felds.
Besides attributes of UI widgets, we observe that nearby text labels rendered in the UI
also provide indication about the sensitiveness of the widgets. For example, a user can
easily understand he is typing a user ID and a password when he sees the UI in Figure 2.1
because the text labels state what the input felds accept. In other words, these text labels
explain the purposes of the UI widgets, and guide users to provide their inputs. Based on
these observations, we propose to leverage the outcome of UI rendering to build a precise model of the UI and analyze the text labels and hints associated with the widgets to
determine their sensitiveness.
The major task of analyzing text labels is to analyze the text labels’ texts, which are
written in natural language. As smartphones have relatively small screens, the texts shown
in the UI are usually very concise and straightforward to understand. For example, these
texts typically are just noun/verb phrases or short sentences (such as the ones shown in Figure 2.1), and tend to directly state the purposes for the corresponding GUI widgets. Since
there is no need to analyze paragraphs or even long sentences, we propose a light-weight
keyword-based algorithm that checks whether text labels contain any sensitive keyword to
determine the sensitiveness of the corresponding GUI widgets.
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2.2.4 Natural Language Processing
With recent research advances in the area of natural language processing (NLP), NLP
techniques have been shown to be fairly accurate in highlighting grammatical structure of
a natural language sentence. Recent work has also shown promising results in using NLP
techniques for analyzing Android descriptions [7, 15]. In our work, we adapt NLP techniques to extract nouns and noun phrases from the texts collected from popular apps, and
identify keywords from the extracted nouns and noun phrases. We next briefy introduce
the key NLP techniques used in this work.
Our approach uses Parts Of Speech (POS) Tagging [11, 12] to identify interesting
words, such as nouns, and flter unrelated words, such as conjunctives like “and/or”. The
technique tags a word in a sentence as corresponding to a particular part of speech (such as
identifying nouns, verbs, and adjectives), based on both its defnition and its relationship
with adjacent and related words in a phrase, sentence, or paragraph. The state-of-the-art
approaches can achieve around 97% [12] accuracy in assigning POS tags for words in
well-written news articles.
Our approach uses Phrase and Clause Parsing to identify phrases for further inspection. Phrase and clause parsing divides a sentence into a constituent set of words (i.e.,
phrases and clauses). These phrases and clauses logically belong together, e.g., Noun
Phrases and Verb Phrases. The state-of-the-art approaches can achieve around 90% [12]
accuracy in identifying phrases and clauses over well-written news articles.
Our approach uses Syntactic parsing [16], combined with the above two techniques, to
generate a parse-tree structure for a sentence, and traverse the parse tree to identify interesting phrases such as noun phrases. The parse tree of a sentence shows the hierarchical view
of the syntax structure for the sentence. Figure 2.4 shows the parse tree for an example
sentence “enter your phone number”. The root node of the tree is the sentence node with
the label S. The interior nodes of the parse tree are labeled by non-terminal categories of
the grammar (e.g., verb phrases VP and noun phrases NP), while the leaf nodes are labeled
by terminal categories (e.g., pronouns PRP, nouns NN and verbs VB). The tree structure
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provides a basis for other tasks within NLP such as question and answer, information extraction, and translation. The state of the art parsers have an F1 score of 90.4% [17].

2.3 Design of SUPOR
In this section, we frst present our threat model, followed by an overview of SUPOR.
Then, we describe each component of SUPOR in details.

2.3.1 Threat Model
We position SUPOR as a static UI analysis tool for detecting sensitive user inputs. Instead of focusing on malicious apps that deliberately evade detection, SUPOR is designed
for effcient and scalable screening of a large number of apps. Most of the apps in the app
markets are legitimate, whose developers try to monetize by gaining user popularity, even
though some of them might be a little bit aggressive on exploiting user privacy for revenue.
Malware can be detected by existing works [18–20], which is out of scope of this paper.
Though the developers sometimes dynamically generate UI elements in the code other
than defning the UI elements via layout fles, we focus on identifying sensitive user inputs
statically defned in layout fles in this work.

2.3.2 Overview
Figure 2.5 shows the workfow of SUPOR. SUPOR consists of three major components: Layout Analysis, UI Sensitiveness Analysis, and Variable Binding. The layout analysis component accepts an APK fle of an app, parses the layout fles inside the APK fle,
and renders the layout fles containing input felds. Based on the outcome of UI rendering,
the UI sensitiveness analysis component associates text labels to the input felds, and determines the sensitiveness of the input felds by checking the texts in the text labels against a
predefned sensitive keyword dataset (Section 2.3.6). The variable binding component then
searches the code to identify the variables that store the values of the sensitive input felds.
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Figure 2.5.: Overview of SUPOR.

With variable binding, existing research efforts in studying the privacy related topics on
predefned well-known sensitive data sources can be applied to sensitive user inputs. For
example, one can use taint analysis to detect disclosures of sensitive user inputs or other
privacy analysis to analyze vulnerabilities of sensitive user inputs in the apps. Next we
describe each component in detail.

2.3.3 Layout Analysis
The goal of the layout analysis component is to render the UIs of an Android app, and
extract the information of input felds: types, hints, and absolute coordinates, which are
later used for the UI sensitiveness analysis.
As we discussed in Section 2.2.3, if we cannot determine the sensitiveness of an input
feld based on its type and hint, we need to fnd a text label that describes the purpose of
the input feld. From the user’s perspective, the text label that describes the purpose of
an input feld must be physically close to the input feld in the screen; otherwise the user
may correlate the text label with other input felds and provide inappropriate inputs. Based
on this insight, the layout analysis component renders the UIs as if the UIs are rendered
in production runs, mimicking how users look at the UIs. Based on the rendered UIs, the
distances between text labels and input felds are computed, and these distances are used
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later to fnd the best descriptive text labels for each input feld. We next describe the two
major steps of the layout analysis component.
The frst step is to identify which layout fles contain input felds by parsing the layout
fles in the APK of an Android app. In this work, we focus on input felds of the type
EditText and all possible sub-types, including custom widgets in the apps. Each input
feld represents a potential sensitive source. However, according to our previous discussion,
the sensitiveness cannot be easily determined by analyzing only the layout fles. Thus, all
the fles containing input felds are used in the second step for UI rendering.
The second step is to obtain the coordinate information of the input felds by rendering the layout fles. Using the rapid UI development kit provided by Android, the layout
analysis component can effectively render standard UI widgets. For custom widgets that
require more complex rendering, the layout analysis component renders them by providing
the closest library superclass to obtain the best result. After rendering a layout fle, the
layout analysis component obtains a UI model, which is a tree-structure model where the
nodes are UI widgets and the edges describe the parent-child relationship between UI widgets. Figure 2.6 shows the UI model obtained by rendering the layout fle in Figure 2.2. For
each rendered UI widget, the coordinates are relative to its parent container widget. Such
relative coordinates cannot be directly used for measuring the distances between two UI
widgets, and thus SUPOR converts the relative coordinates to absolute coordinates with
regards to the screen size.
Coordinate Conversion. SUPOR computes the absolute coordinates of each UI widget level by level, starting with the root container widget. For example, in Figure 2.6,
the root container widget is a LinearLayout, and its coordinates are (0, 50, 480, 752),
representing the left, top, right, and bottom corners. There is no need to convert the coordinates of the root UI widget, since its coordinates are relative to the top left corner
of the screen, and thus are already absolute coordinates. For other UI widgets, SUPOR
computes their absolute coordinates based on their relative coordinates and their parent
container’s absolute coordinates. For example, the relative coordinates of the second UI
widget, TextView, are (16, 16, 60, 33). Since it is a child widget of the root UI widget,
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LinearLa out @ [0, 50, 480, 752]
TextView @ [16, 16, 60, 33], TEXT=“User ID”
EditText @ [16, 33, 464, 81], ID=0x7f090000
TextView @ [16, 81, 79, 98], TEXT=“Password”
EditText @ [16, 98, 464, 146], ID=0x7f090001
Button @ [16, 146, 464, 163]
ID=0x7f090002, TEXT=“Login”
Figure 2.6.: UI model for Figure 2.1 on 480x800 screen. Only the ID, relative coordinates
and text of the widgets are presented here.

its absolute coordinates is computed as (16, 66, 60, 83). This process is repeated until the
coordinates of every UI widget are converted.
In addition to coordinate conversion, SUPOR collects other information of the UI widgets, such as the texts in the text labels and the attributes for input felds (e.g., ID and
inputType).

2.3.4 UI Sensitiveness Analysis
Based on the information collected from the layout analysis, the UI sensitiveness analysis component determines whether a given input feld contains sensitive information. This
component consists of three major steps.
First, if the input feld has been assigned with certain attributes like android:inputType="textPassword", it is directly considered as sensitive. With such attribute, the
original inputs on the UI are concealed after users type them. In most cases these inputs
are passwords.
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Algorithm 1 UI Widget Sensitiveness Analysis
Require: I as an input feld, S as a set of text labels, KW as a pre-defned sensitive keyword
dataset
Ensure: R as whether I is sensitive
1:

Divide the UI plane into nine partitions based on I’s boundary

2:

for all L ∈ S do

3:

score = 0

4:

for all (x, y) ∈ L do

5:

score += distance(I, x, y) ∗ posWeight(I, x, y)

6:

end for

7:

L.score = score / L.numO f Pixels

8:

end for

9:

T = min(S)

10:

R = T.text matches KW

Second, if the input feld contains any hint (i.e., tooltip), e.g., “Enter Password Here”,
the words in the hint are checked: if it contains any keyword in our sensitive keyword
dataset, the input feld is considered sensitive; otherwise, the third step is required to determine its sensitiveness.
Third, SUPOR identifes the text label that describes the purpose of the input feld, and
analyzes the text in the label to determine the sensitiveness. In order to identify text labels
that are close to a given input feld, we provide an algorithm to compute correlation scores
for each pair of a text label and an input feld based on their distances and relative positions.
The details of our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. At frst, SUPOR divides the
UI plane into nine partitions based on the boundaries of the input feld. Figure 2.7 shows
the nine partitions divided by an input feld. Each text label can be placed in one or more
partitions, and the input feld itself is placed in the central partition. For a text label, we
determine how it is correlated to an input feld by computing how each pixel in a text
label is correlated to the input feld (Line 4). The correlation score for a pixel consists of
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Figure 2.7.: The partition of the UI is based on the boundary of the input feld.

two parts (Line 5). The frst part is the Euclidean distance from the pixel to the input feld,
computed using the absolute coordinates. The second part is a weight based on their relative
positions, i.e., which of the nine partitions the widget is in. We build the position-based
weight function based on our empirical observations: if the layout of the apps is top-down
and left-right arranged, the text label that describes the input feld is usually placed at left or
on top of the input feld while the left one is more likely to be the one if it exists. We assign
smallest weight to the pixels in the left partition and second smallest for the top partition.
The right-bottom partition is least possible so we give the largest weight to it. The detailed
weights for each partition is shown in Figure 2.7. Based on the correlation scores of all
the pixels, our algorithm uses the average of the correlation scores as the correlation score
for the pair of the text label and the input feld (Line 7). The label with smaller correlation
score is considered more correlated to the input feld.
After the correlation scores for all text labels are computed, SUPOR selects the text
label that has the smallest score as the descriptive text label for the input feld, and uses
the pre-defned sensitive keyword dataset to determine if the label contains any sensitive
keyword. If yes, the input feld is considered as sensitive.
Example. Figure 2.8 shows an example UI that requires Algorithm 1 for sensitiveness
analysis. This example shows a UI that requests a user to enter personal information.
This UI contains two input felds and two text labels. Neither can SUPOR determine
the sensitiveness through their attributes, nor can SUPOR use any hint to determine the
sensitiveness. SUPOR then applies Algorithm 1 on these two input felds to compute the
correlation scores for each pair of text labels and input felds. The correlation scores are
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Figure 2.8.: Example for UI widget sensitiveness analysis.

Table 2.2.: Scores of the text labels in Figure 2.8.
First Name

Last Name

1st input feld

46.80

218.81

2nd input feld

211.29

46.84

shown in Table 2.2. According to the correlation scores, SUPOR associates “First Name”
to the frst input feld and “Last Name” to the second input feld. Since our keyword dataset
contains keywords “frst name” and “last name” for personal information, SUPOR can
declare the two input felds are sensitive.
Repeating the above steps for every input feld in the app, SUPOR obtains a list of
sensitive input felds. It assigns an contextual ID to each sensitive input feld in the form of
<Layout_ID, Widget_ID>, where Layout_ID is the ID of the layout that contains
the input feld and Widget_ID is the ID of the input feld (i.e., the value of the attribute
“android:id”).
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2.3.5 Variable Binding
With the sensitive input felds identifed in the previous step, the variable binding component performs context-sensitive analysis to bind the input felds to the variables in the
code. The sensitive input felds are identifed using contextual IDs, which include layout
IDs and widget IDs. These contextual IDs can be used to directly locate input felds from
the XML layout fles. To fnd out the variables that store the values of the input felds, SUPOR leverages the binding mechanism provided by Android to load the UI layout and bind
the UI widgets with the code. Such a binding mechanism enables SUPOR to associate
input felds with the proper variables. We refer to these variables the widget variables that
are bound to the input felds.
The variable binding component identifes the instances of the input felds in a contextinsensitive fashion via searching the code using the APIs provided by the rapid UI development kit of Android. As shown in Section 2.2.2, findViewById(ID) is an API that
loads a UI widget to the code. Its argument ID is the numeric ID that specifes which widget defned in the XML to load. Thus, to identify the instances of the input felds, SUPOR
searches the code for such method calls, and compare their arguments to the widget IDs
of the sensitive input felds. If the arguments match any widget ID of the sensitive input
felds, the return values of the corresponding findViewById(ID) are considered as the
widget variables for the sensitive input felds.
One problem here is that developers may assign the same widget ID to UI widgets in
different layout fles, and thus different UI widgets are associated with the same numeric
ID in the code. Our preliminary analysis on 5000 apps discovers that about 22% of the
identifed sensitive input felds have duplicate IDs within the corresponding apps. Since
the context-insensitive analysis cannot distinguish the duplicate widget IDs between layout
fles inside an app, a lot of false positives will be presented.
To reduce false positives, SUPOR adds context-sensitivity into the analysis, associating widget variables with their corresponding layouts. Similar to loading a widget, the
rapid UI development kit provides APIs to load a UI layout into the code. For example,
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setContentView(ID) with a numeric ID as the argument is used to load a UI layout
to the code, as shown at Line 6 in Figure 2.3. Any subsequent findViewById with the
ID WID as the argument returns the UI widget identifed by WID in the newly loaded UI
layout, not the UI widget identifed by WID in the previous UI layout. Thus, to fnd out
which layout is associated with a given widget variable, SUPOR traces back to identify
the closest method call that loads a UI layout1 along the program paths that lead to the invocation of findViewById. We next describe how SUPOR performs context-sensitive
analysis to distinguish widget IDs between layout fles. For the description below, we use
setContentView() as an example API.
Given a widget variable, SUPOR frst identifes the method call findViewById,
and computes an inter-procedural backward slice [21–24] of its receiver object, i.e., the
activity object. This backward slice traces back from findViewById, and includes all
statements that may affect the state of the activity object. SUPOR then searches the slice
backward for the method call setContentView, and uses the argument of the frst found
setContentView as the layout ID. For example, in Figure 2.3, the widget variable txtUid is defned by the findViewById at Line 7, and the activity object of this method
call is an instance of LoginActivity. From the backward slice of the activity object, the frst method call setContentView is found at Line 6, and thus its argument
R.layout.login_activity is associated with txtUid, whose widget ID is specifed by R.id.uid. Both R.layout.login_activity and R.id.uid can be further resolved to identify their numeric IDs, and match with the contextual IDs of sensitive
input felds to determine whether txtUid is a widget variable for a sensitive input feld.

2.3.6 Keyword Dataset Construction
To collect the sensitive keyword dataset, we crawl all texts in the resource fles from
54,371 apps, including layout fles and string resource fles. We split the collected texts
based on newline character (\n) to form a list of texts, and extract words from the texts to
1 SUPOR

considers both Activity.setContentView() and LayoutInflater.inflate() as
the methods to load UI layouts due to their prevalence.
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form a list of words. Both of these lists are then sorted based on the frequencies of text
lines and words, respectively. We then systematically inspect these two lists with the help
of the adapted NLP techniques. Next we describe how we identify sensitive keywords in
detail.
First, we adapt NLP techniques to extract nouns and noun phrases from the top 5,000
frequent text lines. Our technique frst uses Stanford parser [12] to parse each text line
into a syntactic tree as discussed in Section 2.2.4, and then traverses the parse tree level by
level to identify nouns and noun phrases. For the text lines that do not contain any noun or
noun phrase, our technique flters out these text lines, since such text lines usually consist
of only prepositions (e.g., to), verbs (e.g., update please), or unrecognized symbols. From
the top 5,000 frequent text lines, our technique extracts 4,795 nouns and noun phrases.
For the list of words, our technique flters out words that are not nouns due to the similar
reasons. From the top 5,000 frequent words, our technique obtains 3,624 words. We then
manually inspect these two sets of frequent nouns and noun phrases to identify sensitive
keywords. As phrases other than noun phrases may indicate sensitive information, we
further extract consecutive phrases consisting of two and three words from the text lists
and manually inspect the top 200 frequent two-word and three-word phrases to expand our
sensitive keyword set.
Second, we expand the keyword set by searching the list of text lines and the list of
words using the identifed words. For example, we further fnd “cvv code” for credit card
by searching the lists using the top-ranked word “code”, and fnd “national ID” by searching
the lists using the top-ranked word “id”. We also expand the keywords using synonyms of
the keywords based on WordNet [13, 14, 25].
Third, we further expand the keywords by using Google Translate to translate the keywords from English into other languages. Currently we support Chinese and Korean besides English.
These keywords are manually classifed into 10 categories, and part of the keyword
dataset is presented in Table 2.3. Note that we do not use “Address” for the category
“Personal Info”. Although personal address is sensitive information, our preliminary results
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Table 2.3.: Part of keyword dataset.
Category

Keywords

Credential

pin code, pin number, password

Health

weight, height, blood type, calories

Identity

username, user ID, nickname

Credit Card

credit card number, cvv code

SSN

social security number, national ID

Personal Info

frst name, last name, gender, birthday

Financial Info

deposit amount, income, payment

Contact

phone number, e-mail, email, gmail

Account

log in, sign in, register

Protection

security answer, identifcation code

show that this keyword also matches URL address bars in browsers, causing many false
positives. Also, we do not fnd interesting privacy disclosures based on this keyword in our
preliminary results, and thus “Address” is not used in our keyword dataset. Although this
keyword dataset is not a complete dataset that covers every sensitive keyword appearing in
Android apps, our evaluation results (in Section 2.5) show that it is a relatively complete
dataset for the ten categories that we focus on in this work.

2.4 Implementation
In this section, we provide the details of our implementation of SUPOR, including
the frameworks and tools we built upon and certain tradeoffs we make to improve the
effectiveness.
SUPOR accepts APK fles as inputs, and uses a tool built on top of Apktool [26] to
extract resource fles and bytecode from the APK fle. The Dalvik bytecode is translated
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into an intermediate representation (IR), which is based on dexlib in Baksmali [27]. The
IR is further converted to WALA [28] static single assignment format (SSA). WALA [28]
works as the underlying analysis engine of SUPOR, providing various functionalities, e.g.,
call graph building, dependency graph building, and point-to analysis.
The UI rendering engine is built on the UI rendering engine from the ADT Eclipse
plug-ins Besides improving the engine to better render custom widgets, we also make the
rendering more resilient using all available themes. Due to SDK version compatibility,
not every layout can be rendered in every theme. We try multiple themes until we fnd
a successful rendering. Although different themes might make UI slightly different, the
effectiveness of our algorithm should not be affected. The reason is that apps should not
confuse users in the successfully rendered themes, and thus our algorithm designed to
mimic what users see the UIs should work accordingly.
To demonstrate the usefulness of SUPOR, we implement a privacy disclosure detection
system by combining SUPOR with static taint analysis. This system enables us to conduct
a study on the disclosures of sensitive user inputs. We build a taint analysis engine on top
of Dalysis [3] and make several customizations to improve the effectiveness.
The taint analysis engine constraints the taint propagation to only variables and methodcall returns of String type. Therefore, method calls that return primitive types (e.g.,int)
are ignored. There are two major reasons for making this tradeoff. The frst is that the
sensitive information categories we focus on are passwords, user names, emails, and so
on, and these are usually not numeric values. The second is that empirically we found a
quite number of false positives related to fows of primitive types due to the incompleteness
of API models for the Android framework. This observation-based refnement suppresses
many false positives. For example, one false warning we observed is that the length of
a tainted string (tainted.length()) is logged, and tracking such length causes too
many false positives afterwards. Since such fow does not disclose signifcant information
of the user inputs, removing the tracking of such primitive values reduces the sources to
track and improves the precision of the tracking.
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To further suppress false warnings, we model data structures of key-value pairs, such
as Bundle and BasicNameValuePair. Bundle is widely used for storing an activity’s previously frozen state, and BasicNameValuePair is usually used to encode
name-value pairs for HTTP URL parameters or other web transmission parameters, such
as JSON. For each detected disclosure fow, we record the keys when the analysis fnds
method calls that insert values into the data structures, e.g.,bundle.put("key1", tainted). For any subsequent method call that retrieves values from the data structures,
e.g.,bundle.get("key2"), we compare the key for retrieving values key2 with the
recorded keys. If no matches are found, we flter out the disclosure fow.
To identify sensitive user inputs, SUPOR includes totally 11 source categories, including the 10 categories listed in Section 2.3.6 and an additional category PwdLike for the
input felds identifed as sensitive using their attributes such as inputType. The PwdLike
category is prioritized if it has some overlapping with the other categories. Once the widget variables of the sensitive input felds are found, we consider any subsequent method
calls on the variables that retrieve values from the input felds as source locations, such as
getText(). To identify privacy disclosures of the sensitive user inputs, SUPOR mainly
focuses on the information fows that transfer the sensitive data to the following two types
of sinks: (1) the sinks of output channels that send the information out from the phone
(e.g., SMS and Network) and (2) the sinks of public places on the phone (e.g., logging and
content provider writes).
In details, the sink dataset includes fve categories of sink APIs, among which two categories are SMS send (e.g.,SmsManager.sendTextMessage()) and Network (e.g.,HttpClient.execute()). The other three are related to local storage: logging (e.g.,Log.d()), content provider writes (e.g.,ContentResolver.insert()), and local fle
writes (e.g.,OutputStream.write()). Totally there are 236 APIs.
Our implementation, excluding the underlying libraries and the core taint analysis engine, accounts for about 4K source lines of code (SLoC) in Java.
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2.5 Evaluations and Experiments
We conducted comprehensive evaluations on SUPOR over a large number of apps
downloaded from the offcial Google Play store. We frst evaluated the performance of
SUPOR and demonstrated its scalability. We then measured the accuracy of the UI sensitiveness analysis and the accuracy of SUPOR in detecting disclosures of sensitive user
inputs. In addition, our case studies on selected apps present practical insights of sensitive
user input disclosures, which are expected to contribute to a community awareness.

2.5.1 Evaluation Setup
The evaluations of SUPOR were conducted on a cluster of eight servers with an Intel
Xeon CPU E5-1650 and 64/128GB of RAM. During the evaluations, we launched concurrent SUPOR instances on 64-bit JVM with a maximum heap space of 16GB. On each
server 3 apps were concurrently analyzed, so the cluster handled 24 apps in parallel.
In our evaluations, we used the apps collected from the offcial Google Play store in
June 2013. We applied SUPOR to analyze 6,000 apps ranked by top downloads, with 200
apps for each category. Based on the results of the 6,000 apps, we further applied SUPOR
on another 10,000 apps in 20 selected categories. Each of the 20 categories is found to have
at least two apps with sensitive user input disclosures.
For each app, if it contains at least one input feld in layout fles, the app is analyzed
by the UI sensitiveness analysis. If SUPOR identifes any sensitive input feld of the app,
the app is further analyzed by the taint analysis to detect sensitive user input disclosures.
Table 2.4 shows the statistics of these apps. A small portion of the apps do not contain
any layout fles and about 1/3 of the apps do not have any input feld in layout fles. This
is reasonable because many Game apps do not require users to enter information. 35% of
the apps without layout fles and 17% of the apps without input felds belong to different
sub-categories of games. 11 apps (0.07%) cannot be analyzed by SUPOR due to various
parsing errors in rendering their layout fles. In total, 60.33% of the apps contain input
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Table 2.4.: Statistics of 16,000 apps.
#Apps

Percentage

Without Layout Files

625

3.91%

Without Input Fields

5,711

35.69%

Without Sensitive Input Fields

4,731

29.57%

With Sensitive Input Fields

4,922

30.76%

11

0.07%

16,000

100.00%

Parsing Errors
TOTAL

felds in their layout fles, among which more than half of the apps are further analyzed
because sensitive input felds are found via the UI sensitiveness analysis.
As not every layout containing input felds is identifed with sensitive input felds, we
show the statistics of the layouts for the 4,922 apps identifed with sensitive input felds.
Among these apps, 47,885 layouts contain input felds and thus these layouts are rendered.
Among the rendered layouts, 19,265 (40.2%) are found to contain sensitive keywords (no
matter whether the keywords are associated with any input feld). This is the upper bound
of the number of layouts that can be identifed with sensitive input felds. In fact, 17,332
(90.0%) of the 19,265 layouts with sensitive keywords are identifed with sensitive input
felds.

2.5.2 Performance Evaluation
The whole experiment for 16,000 apps takes 1439.8 minutes, making a throughput of
11.1 apps per minutes on the eight-server cluster. The following analysis is only for the
4,922 apps identifed with sensitive input felds, if not specifed.
The UI analysis in SUPOR includes decompiling APK fles, rendering layouts, and
performing UI sensitiveness analysis. For each app with sensitive input felds, SUPOR
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needs to perform the UI analysis for at least 1 layout and at most 190 layouts, while the
median number is 7 and the average number is 9.7. Though the largest execution time
required for this analysis is about 2 minutes. 96.3% of the apps require less than 10 seconds
to render all layouts in an app. The median analysis time is 5.2 seconds and the average
time is 5.7 seconds for one app. Compared with the other parts of SUPOR, the UI analysis
is quite effcient, accounting for only 2.5% of the total analysis time on average. Also,
the UI sensitiveness analysis, including the correlation score computation and keyword
matching, accounts for less than 1% of the total UI analysis time, while decompiling APK
fles and rendering layouts take most of the time.
To detect sensitive user input disclosures, our evaluation sets a maximum analysis time
of 20 minutes. 18.1% of the apps time out in our experiments but 73.7% require less than
10 minutes. The apps with many entry points tend to get stuck in taint analysis, and are
more likely to timeout. Scalability of static taint analysis is a hard problem, but we are
not worse than related work. The timeout mechanism is enforced for the whole analysis,
but the system will wait for I/O to get partial results. In practice, we can allow a larger
maximum analysis time so that more apps can be analyzed. Among the apps fnished in
time, the median analysis time is 1.9 minutes and the average analysis time is 3.7 minutes.
The performance results show that SUPOR is a scalable solution that can statically
analyze UIs of a massive number of apps and detect sensitive user input disclosures on
these apps. Compared with existing static taint analysis techniques, the static UI analysis
introduced in this work is highly effcient, and its performance overhead is negligible.

2.5.3 Effectiveness of UI Sensitiveness Analysis
To evaluate the accuracy of the UI sensitiveness analysis, we randomly select 40 apps
and manually inspect the UIs of these 40 apps to measure the accuracy of the UI sensitiveness analysis.
First, we randomly select 20 apps reported without sensitive input felds, and manually
inspect these apps to measure the false negatives of SUPOR. In these apps, the largest
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number of layouts SUPOR renders is 5 and the total number of layouts containing input
felds is 39 (1.95 layouts per app). SUPOR successfully renders 38 layouts and identifes
57 input felds (2.85 input felds per app). SUPOR fails to render 1 layout due to the
lack of necessary themes for a third-party library. By analyzing these 57 input felds, we
confrm that SUPOR has only one false negative (FN), i.e., failing to mark one input feld
as sensitive in the app com.strlabs.appdietas. This input feld requests users to enter their
weights, belonging to the Health category in our keyword dataset. However, the text of
the descriptive text label for the input feld is “Peso de hoy”, which is “Today Weight” in
Spanish. Since our keyword dataset focuses on sensitive keywords in English, SUPOR has
a false negative. Such false negatives can be reduced by expanding our keyword dataset to
support more languages.
Second, we randomly select 20 apps reported with sensitive input felds. Table 2.5
shows the detailed analysis results. Column “#Layouts ” counts the number of layouts
containing input felds in each app, while Column “#Layouts with SIF” presents the number of layouts reported with sensitive input felds. Column “#Input Fields” lists the total
number of input felds in each app and Column “#Reported SIF” gives the detailed information about how many input felds are identifed by checking the inputType attribute,
by matching the hint text, and by analyzing the associated text labels. Sub-Column “Total” presents the total number of sensitive input felds identifed by SUPOR in each app.
Columns “FP” and “FN” show the number of false positives and the number of false negatives produced by SUPOR in classifying input felds. Column “Dup ID” shows if an app
contains any duplicate widget ID for sensitive input felds. These duplicate IDs belong
to either sensitive input felds (represented by ◦) or non-sensitive input felds (•). For all
the layouts in these 20 apps, SUPOR successfully renders the layouts except for App 18,
which has 29 layouts containing input felds but SUPOR renders only 17 layouts. The
reason is that Apktool fails to decompile the app completely.
The results show that for these 20 apps, SUPOR identifes 149 sensitive input felds
with 4 FPs and 3 FNs, and thus the achieved true positives (TP) is 145. Combined with
the 20 apps identifed without sensitive input felds (0 FP and 1 FN), SUPOR achieves an
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Table 2.5.: UI analysis details for 20 randomly chosen apps.
App

#Layouts

#Input

#Layouts

#Reported SIF

I Fields I with SIF I Password I Hint I Label

I ID II

FP
Total

I

FN

Dup

I ID I

I

1

8

18

4

6

0

3

9

2

37

77

2

0

0

8

8

3

3

3

1

0

1

0

1

4

4

9

3

0

0

6

6

5

5

7

1

1

0

0

1

6

17

52

10

6

12

12

30

7

4

5

2

0

0

3

3

8

15

22

9

8

3

2

13

9

3

7

1

1

1

0

2

10

7

16

1

0

0

1

1

11

5

6

1

1

1

0

2

12

17

33

8

8

9

0

17

◦•

13

26

60

10

0

0

12

12

◦•

14

2

8

2

1

0

4

5

15

14

26

5

2

3

0

5

16

4

7

1

1

0

0

1

17

4

8

3

2

3

0

5

•

18

29

25

4

4

0

6

10

◦

19

24

37

8

9

6

1

16

◦

20

1

2

1

0

2

0

2

229

I 428 I

77

I Total II

I

50

2

◦

◦

1

◦

1

2

1

I 41 I 58 I 149 I 4 I 3 I

◦•

I
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average precision of 97.3% (precision =
(recall =

TP
T P+FN

TP
T P+FP

= 145/149) and an average recall of 97.3%

= 145/(145+(1+3)).

We next describe the reasons for the FNs and the FPs. SUPOR has two false negatives
in App 1, in which the text label “Answer” is not identifed as a sensitive keyword. But according to the context, it means “security answer”, which should be sensitive. Although this
phrase is modeled as a sensitive phrase in our keyword dataset, SUPOR cannot easily associate “Answer” with the phrase, resulting in a false negative. In App 8, SUPOR marks an
input feld as sensitive because the associated text label containing the keyword “Height”.
However, based on the context, the app actually asks the user to enter the expected page
height of a PDF fle. Such issues can be alleviated by employing context-sensitive NLP
analysis [29].
SUPOR also has two FPs in App 6 and App 8 due to the inaccuracy of text label
association. In App 6 shown in Figure 2.9, the hint of the “Delivery Instructions” input
feld does not contain sensitive keywords, and thus SUPOR identifes the close text label
for determining its sensitiveness. However, SUPOR incorrectly associates a description
label of “Email” to the “Delivery Instructions” input feld based on their close distances.
Since this description contains sensitive keywords such as email, SUPOR considers the
“Delivery Instructions” input feld as sensitive, causing a false positive. Finally, SUPOR
has both FPs and FNs for App 14, since its arrangements of input felds and their text labels
are not accurately captured by our position-based weights that give preferences for left and
top positioned text labels.
To evaluate the effectiveness of resolving duplicate IDs, We instrumented SUPOR to
output detailed information when identifying the widget variables. We did not fnd any case
where SUPOR incorrectly associates the widget variables with the input felds based on
the contextual IDs, but potentially SUPOR may have inaccurate results due to infeasible
sequences of entry points that can be executed. We next present an example to show how
backward slicing help SUPOR distinguish duplicate widget IDs. App 17 has two layouts
with the same hierarchy. Layout A contains a sensitive input feld with the ID w1 while
Layout B contains a non-sensitive input feld with the same ID w1. Both layouts are loaded
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Email Address - Required
Your $5 Domino's Dollars•• code will be sent to this email address
within 48 hrs of this order being placed. Domino's Dollars•• may be used
toward online orders within 10 days of receipt.
Delivery Instructions - Optional

Figure 2.9.: False positive example in UI sensitiveness analysis.

via LayoutInflater.inflate and then findViewById is invoked separately to
obtain the enclosed input felds. Without the backward slicing, SUPOR considers the
input feld with the ID w1 in the Layout B as sensitive, which is a false positive. With the
backward slicing, SUPOR can distinguish the input feld with the ID w1 in Layout B with
the input feld with the ID w1 in Layout A, and correctly flter out the non-sensitive input
feld in Layout B.

2.5.4 Accuracy of Detecting Sensitive User Input Disclosures
In our experiments, 355 apps are reported with sensitive user input disclosures. The
reported apps belong to 25 out of the 30 categories in Google Play Store and 20 categories
have at least 2 apps reported. We next report the accuracy of detecting sensitive user input
disclosures.
Figure 2.10 shows the number of true positives and the number of false positives by
taint source and sink categories. If an app is reported with multiple disclosure fows and
one of them is a false positive, the app is considered as a false positive. Through manually
evaluating the 104 apps reported cases from the frst 6,000 analyzed apps, we fnd false
positives in 9 apps. Therefore, the overall false positive rate is about 8.7%, i.e., the accuracy
of privacy disclosure detection is 91.3%. We investigated the false positives and found
that these false positives were mostly resulted from the limitations of the underlying taint
analysis framework, such as the lack of accurate modeling of arrays.
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Figure 2.10.: True positives and false positives by source/sink categories for the reported
apps.
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Figure 2.11.: Case study: National ID and password disclosure example without protection.

2.5.5 Case Studies
To improve the community’s awareness and understanding of sensitive user input disclosures, we conducted cases studies on four selected apps from the source categories SSN,
PwdLike, Credit Card, and Health. These case studies present interesting facts of sensitive
user input disclosures, and also demonstrate the usefulness of SUPOR. We also inform the
developers of the apps mentioned in this section about the detected disclosures.
com.yes123.mobile is an app for job hunting. The users are required to register with
their national ID and a password to use the service. When the users input the ID and
password, and then click log in (see Figure 2.11), the app sends both their national IDs
and passwords via Internet without any protection (e.g., hashing or through HTTPS channel). Since national ID is quite sensitive (similar as Social Security Number), such limited
protection in transmission may lead to serious privacy disclosure problems.
The second example app (craigs.pro.plus) shows a legitimate disclosure where HTTPS
connections are used to send user sensitive inputs to its server for authentication. Even
though the password itself is not encoded (e.g., hashing), we believe HTTPS connections
provide a better protection layer to resist the disclosures during communications. Also we
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Credit Card Number

This field is disclosed to logging
Credit Card Security Number

This field is disclosed to l9gging
Expiration Date
Month

LJ LJ
Year

Credit Card Holder First Name

This field is d isclosed to logging
Figure 2.12.: Case study: Credit card information disclosure example.

fnd that popular apps developed by enterprise companies are more likely to adopt HTTPS,
providing better protection for their users.
To better understand whether sensitive user inputs are properly protected, we further
inspect 104 apps, of which 44 apps send sensitive user inputs via network. Among these
44 apps, only 10 of them adopt HTTPS connections, while the majority of apps transmit
sensitive user inputs in plain text via HTTP connections. Such study results indicate that
most developers are still unaware of the risks posed by sensitive user input disclosures, and
more efforts should be devoted to provide more protections on sensitive user inputs.
Our third example app (com.nitrogen.android) discloses credit card information, a critical fnancial information provided by the users. Figure 2.12 shows the rendered UI of the
app. The three input felds record credit card number, credit card security number, and the
card holder’s name. Because these felds are not decorated with textPassword input
type and they do not contain any hints, SUPOR uses the UI sensitiveness analysis to compute correlation scores for each text label. As we can see from the UI, the text label “Credit

39
Weight:

Disclosed to logging

Ex: 100lbs or 45.35kg
Height:

Ex: 6ft 2in, 74in, or 1.9m

Ois~losed to lqgging

Sex:

Age:

Ex: 34

(:) Female

(:) Male

Adjustment:

Ex: 3 or-2
Figure 2.13.: Case study: Health information disclosure.

Card Number” and the text label “Credit Card Security Number” are equally close to the
frst input feld. As our algorithm considers weights based on the relative positions between
text labels and input felds, SUPOR correctly associates the corresponding text labels for
these three input felds, and the taint analysis identifes sensitive user input disclosures for
all these three input felds to logging.
Our last example shows that SUPOR also identifes apps that disclose personal health
information to logging. Figure 2.13 shows the rendered UI of the layout dpacacl in app
com.canofsleep.wwdiary, which belongs to the category HEALTH && FITNESS. This
app discloses personal health information through the user inputs collected from the UI. As
we can see, even though all input felds on the UI hold hint texts, these texts do not contain
any sensitive keywords. Therefore, SUPOR still needs to identify the best descriptive text
label for each input feld. Based on the UI sensitiveness analysis, SUPOR successfully
marks the frst three input felds as sensitive, i.e., the input felds that accept weight, height
and age. But based on the taint analysis, only the frst two input felds are detected with
disclosure fows to logging. Similar to fnancial information, such health information about
users’ wellness is also very sensitive to the users.
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Although Google tries to get rid of some of the known sinks that contribute most of the
public leaks by releasing new Android versions, many people globally may still continue
using older Android releases for a very long time (about 14.2% of Android phones globally
using versions older than Jelly Bean [30]). If malware accesses the logs on these devices,
all the credit card information can be exploited to malicious adversaries. Thus, certain level
of protection is necessary for older versions of apps. Also, SUPOR fnds that some apps
actually sanitize the sensitive user inputs (e.g., hashing) before these inputs are disclosed
in public places on the phone, indicating that a portion of developers do pay attention to
protecting sensitive user input disclosures on the phone.

2.6 Discussion
SUPOR is designed as an effective and scalable solution to screening a large number
of apps for sensitive user inputs. In this work, we have demonstrated that SUPOR can
be combined with static taint analysis to automatically detect potential sensitive user input
disclosures. Such analysis can be directly employed by app markets to raise warnings, or
by developers to verify whether their apps accidentally disclose sensitive user inputs. Also,
SUPOR can be paired with dynamic taint analysis to alert users before the sensitive user
inputs escape from the phones.
SUPOR focuses on input felds, a major type of UI widgets to collect user inputs. Such
UI widgets record what user type and contain high entropy, unlike yes/no buttons which
contain low entropy. It is quite straightforward to extend our current approach to handle
more diverse widgets.
SUPOR chooses the light-weight keyword-based technique to determine the sensitiveness of input felds since the texts contained in the associated text labels are usually short
and straightforward to understand. Our evaluations show that in general these keywords are
highly effective in determining the sensitiveness of input felds. Certain keywords may produce false positives since these keywords have different meanings under different contexts.
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To alleviate such issues, we may leverage more advanced NLP techniques that consider
contexts [29].

2.7 Related Work
Many great research works [1–4, 6, 9, 31–36] focus on privacy leakage problems on
predefned sensitive data sources on the phone. SUPOR identifes sensitive user inputs,
and may enable most of the existing research on privacy studies to be applied to sensitive
user inputs. As a result, our research compliments the existing works. FlowDroid [35,
36] also employs a limited form of sensitive input felds—password felds. Compared
with FlowDroid, we leverage static UI rendering and NLP techniques to identify different
categories of sensitive input felds in an extensible manner. Susi [37] employs a machine
learning approach to detect pre-defned source/sinks from Android Framework. In contrast,
SUPOR focus on a totally different type of sensitive sources–user inputs through GUI.
Moreover, a few approaches are designed for controlling the known privacy leaks.
AppFence [38] employs fake data or network blocking to protect privacy leaks to Internet with user supplied policies. Nadkarni et al. provide new OS mechanisms for proper
information sharing cross apps [39].
NLP techniques have been used to study app descriptions [7, 8, 15]. WHYPER [7] and
AutoCog [8] leverages NLP techniques to understand whether the application descriptions
refect the permission usage. CHABADA [15] also applies topic modelling, an NLP technique to detecting malicious behaviors of Android apps. It generates clusters according
to the topic, which consists of a cluster of words that frequently occur together. Then, it
tries to detect the outliers as malicious behaviors. CHABADA does not focus on detecting
privacy leaks. On the other hand, SUPOR leverages NLP techniques to identify sensitive keywords and further use those keywords to classify the descriptive text labels and the
associated input felds.
Furthermore, there are a few important related works using UI related information to
detect different types of vulnerabilities and attacks. AsDroid [40] checks UI text to detect
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the contradiction between expected behavior inferred from the UI and the program behavior
represented by APIs. Chen et al. study the GUI spoofng vulnerabilities in IE browser [41].
Mulliner et al. discover GUI element misuse (GEM), a type of GUI related access control violation vulnerabilities and design GEM Miner to automatically detect GEMs [42].
SUPOR focuses on sensitive user input identifcation which is different from the problems
studied by these existing works.
The closest related work is UIPicker [43], which also focuses on sensitive user input
identifcation. UIPicker uses supervised learning to train a classifer based on the features
extracted from the texts and the layout descriptions of the UI elements. It also considers the
texts of the sibling elements in the layout fle. Unlike UIPicker that uses sibling elements in
the layout fle as the description text for a UI widget, which could easily include unrelated
texts as features, SUPOR selects only the text labels that are physically close to input felds
in the screen, mimicking how users look at the UI, and uses the texts in the text labels to
determine the sensitiveness of the input felds. Also, their techniques in extracting privacyrelated texts could complement our NLP techniques to further improve our keyword dataset
construction.
In the software engineering domain, there are quite a few efforts on GUI reverse engineering [10, 44–47] for GUI testing. GUITAR is a well-known framework for general
GUI testing, and GUI ripper [10], a component of GUITAR targets general desktop applications, uses dynamic analysis to extract GUI related information and requires human
intervention when the tools cannot fll in proper information in the applications. In [44]
and [46, 47], two different approaches have been proposed to convert the hard-coded GUI
layout to model-based layout (such as XML/HTML layout). GUISurfer leverages source
code to derive the relationships between different given UI widgets. In contract, SUPOR
focuses on mobile apps and in particular Android apps, and leverages the facility from
existing rapid UI development kits to identify and render UI widgets statically.
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we study the possibility of scalably detecting sensitive user inputs, an
important yet mostly neglected sensitive source in mobile apps. We leverage the rapid UI
development kits of modern mobile OSes to detect sensitive input felds and correlate these
input felds to the app code, enabling various privacy analyses on sensitive user inputs. We
design and implement SUPOR, a new static analysis tool that automatically identifes sensitive input felds by analyzing both input feld attributes and surrounding descriptive text
labels through static UI parsing and rendering. Leveraging NLP techniques, we build mobile app specifc sensitive word vocabularies that can be used to determine the sensitiveness
of given texts. To enable various privacy analyses on sensitive user inputs, we further propose a context-sensitive approach to associate the input felds with corresponding variables
in the app code.
To demonstrate the usefulness of SUPOR, we build a privacy disclosure discovery system by combining SUPOR with static taint analysis to analyze the sensitive information of
the variables that store the user inputs from the identifed sensitive input felds. We apply
the system to 16,000 popular Android apps, and SUPOR achieves an average precision
of 97.3% and also an average recall of 97.3% in detecting sensitive user inputs. SUPOR
fnds 355 apps with privacy disclosures and the false positive rate is 8.7%. We also demonstrate interesting real-world cases related to national ID, username/password, credit card
and health information.
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3

BIDTEXT: DETECTING SENSITIVE DATA DISCLOSURE VIA
BI-DIRECTIONAL TEXT CORRELATION ANALYSIS

Traditional sensitive data disclosure analysis faces two challenges: to identify sensitive data
that is not generated by specifc API calls, and to report the potential disclosures when the
disclosed data is recognized as sensitive only after the sink operations. We address these
issues by developing B ID T EXT, a novel static technique to detect sensitive data disclosures.
B ID T EXT formulates the problem as a type system, in which variables are typed with the
text labels that they encounter (e.g., during key-value pair operations). The type system
features a novel bi-directional propagation technique that propagates the variable label sets
through forward and backward data-fow. A data disclosure is reported if a parameter at
a sink point is typed with a sensitive text label. We have already gotten some preliminary
results by evaluating B ID T EXT on some real-world Android apps. So far we have observed
that the false positive rate for B ID T EXT is 10%.

3.1 Introduction
Sensitive data disclosure has been a long-standing challenge for data security. By accessing the disclosed sensitive information, adversaries can learn about the system and
then conduct attack [48, 49]. A prominent example is the OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability disclosed in 2014. The OpenSSL versions with such a faw allow remote attackers to
retrieve sensitive data, for example, user authentication credentials and secret keys [50,51].
Attackers can then compromise the target systems with the disclosed sensitive information.
The proliferation of mobile devices [52, 53] makes the situation even worse since mobile devices process a lot of sensitive user data. Previous studies showed that it is common
that mobile apps undesirably disclose sensitive user information [2, 54–56]. Many techniques have been proposed that work at the system level or the application level, static or
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dynamic [1, 4, 31, 57]. Haris et al. provide a comprehensive list of the approaches to detecting sensitive information disclosures in mobile computing [58]. All these approaches
require defnition of the sensitive data sources, usually certain APIs whose return value is
sensitive. With the defnition, if forward data fow is observed between taint sources and
sinks, disclosure defects are reported. Later, researchers realized that some generic APIs
may return sensitive values, depending on the context, although they may return insensitive
values in many cases. SUPOR [59] and UIPicker [43] aimed to identify which user inputs
on the user interfaces can be sensitive. Then the sensitive inputs are associated with the
variables in the code such that static or dynamic forward data fow analysis can be applied
to detect the potential sensitive user inputs disclosures. Sensitive user inputs are identifed
in the context of the user interfaces which contain text or graphical information to instruct
what the users should enter.
However, the above solutions still have limitations. Sensitive data may come from
generic API methods not related to UI (e.g., loading data from some fle or receiving data
from network). In these cases, most existing approaches would not work properly. We
cannot simply treat the generic APIs as the taint sources as that will lead to a large number
of false warnings. In addition, forward data fow analysis is insuffcient. In many cases, a
piece of data may be frst emitted through a sink and then later typed as sensitive. There
may not be any forward data fow from the type revelation point to the sink point.
In this section, we develop B ID T EXT, a technique to detect data disclosures by examining the text labels correlated with variables. The text labels, either from the code (e.g.,
the textual keys in key-value pairs) or the UI, provide rich information about the data contained in the variables. B ID T EXT extracts these labels, and leverages a novel type system
to propagate these labels through both backward and forward data fow. Data disclosures
are reported when a parameter at a sink point is typed with a sensitive textual label. The
bi-directional propagation scheme is unique and different from the traditional unifcation
based type inference systems. It features the capability of avoiding undesirable unifcation
of text labels, enabling a low false positive rate. Backward propagation allows B ID T EXT
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to capture cases in which data sensitiveness is revealed after the data is sent through some
sink.
Our work makes the following contributions:
• We propose B ID T EXT, a novel method to detect sensitive data disclosures. B ID T EXT leverages constant text labels and features a novel type system that performs
bi-directional text label propagation.
• We implement a prototype of B ID T EXT for Android apps, and evaluate it on some
real-world apps. So far we have observed that the false positive rate for B ID T EXT is
10%.
• B ID T EXT is available at https://bitbucket.org/hjjandy/toydroid.
bidtext.

3.2 Motivating Example
We use a real-world Android app com.buycott.android to motivate our technique. It
is an app that allows users to check the company/vendor of a product by scanning the
product’s barcode. It even allows users to view the family tree of the company/vendor.
Users can then make decision on whether this is a company that rips off its customers so
that they do not want to have business with. Users can also start/join campaigns against
specifc companies [60].
Figure 3.1 shows a piece of simplifed code snippet from the app. The app sends a
request to the Web server and obtains a list of post messages. The HTTP response is
converted to a string in the app and then sent to a handler via a Message object. The
following operations are present in the code snippet. At line 7, a key-value mapping is
retrieved from the Message object. Then the data string of the message is obtained from
the mapping at line 8. Right after that, the data string is written to the log fle at line 9.
Note that writing to a log fle is usually considered as a sink for data disclosures [9, 35, 36,
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1 class CampaignActivity_20 implements Handler.Callback{
2

CampaignActivity act;

3

CampaignActivity_20(CampaignActivity a){

4

this.act = a;

5

}

6

public boolean handleMessage(Message msg){

7

Bundle b = msg.getData();

8

String dt = b.getString("data");

9

Log.d("CampaignActivity", "Got data back: " + dt);//sink

10

Runnable r = new CampaignActivity_20_1(dt);

11

act.runOnUiThread(r);

12
13

return false;
}

14 }
15 class CampaignActivity_20_1 implements Runnable{
16

String jsonString;

17

CampaignActivity_20_1(String data){

18

jsonString = data;

19

}

20

public void run(){

21

JSONArray jsonArray = new JSONArray(jsonString);

22

int len = jsonArray.length();

23

for (int i=0; i<len; i++) {

24

JSONObject json = jsonArray.getJSONObject(i);

25

String url = json.getString("avatar_url");

26

ImageView iv = ... // omitted

27

displayImage(url, iv); // omitted

28

String un = "<b>" + json.getString("username") + "</b>" +

29

TextView tv = ... // omitted

30

tv.setText(Html.formHtml(un));

json.getString("created_at");

31

String c = json.getString("content");

32

TextView ctv = ... // omitted

33

ctv.setText(Html.fromHtml(c));

34

// ...

35
36

}
}

37 }

Figure 3.1.: Motivating example from app com.buycott.android.
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Figure 3.2.: Data fow (solid arrows) and type propagation (dashed arrows) for Figure 3.1.

59] because log fles can be accessed by malware1 . After the logging operation, the app
instantiates a Runnable object with the data string at line 10, which runs in the UI thread
(line 11) to allow interactions with UI elements.
The data string is transmitted to the Runnable instance via the instantiation at line
10. Inside the constructor at line 17, the data is stored in a feld variable jsonString
at line 18. When the UI thread is running, the run() method at line 20 is invoked. The
data string is converted to a JSONArray object at line 21 which is then iterated. Every
element in the array is a JSONObject (line 24). The app then obtains the URL for the
avatar image, the corresponding user Id, the time of creation and the content of the post
message by looking for the values via corresponding keys in the JSON object (lines 25, 28,
and 31). All such information is shown on some UI elements (e.g., line 33).
Now let’s consider the potential sensitive data disclosure in this running example. Based
on the above description, the data falling into the sink at line 9 comes from the Web server.
1 The

recent version of Android has substantially mitigated this problem by limiting access to log fles. But
there are still a large number of devices running old versions of Android. Note that B ID T EXT is general to
support various confgurations of sink points.
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We later know that the data contains some sensitive user account information. In other
words, the app retrieves the sensitive user account information from the server and writes
it to the local log fle without any encryption. This is a typical kind of undesirable information disclosure [61, 62] that emits sensitive information from server such as user account,
balance in bank account, and employee salary to local fles.
Traditional sensitive data disclosure analysis inspects the data fow between some sensitive source point, for example, an API call whose return value can be easily recognized as
sensitive (e.g.,Tele-phonyManager.getDeviceId() in Android), and a sink point
(e.g., a fle write or a socket send). If forward data fow can be discovered from the source
point to the sink point, a disclosure problem is reported. In this example, while we do have
data fow from the Web server response to the logging operation but we cannot determine
whether the response contains sensitive data from the operations along the data fow. If we
treat all data from server sensitive, a lot of false alarms will be produced; but if we simply
ignore them, we miss true disclosures as in this example.
Different from the traditional disclosure analysis, our technique relies on the observation that the sensitiveness of data used in applications can be recognized through examining
the textual information involved in the operations. Such texts are constant strings in either
the code or the user interfaces. We randomly sampled 2,000 Android apps and found that
on average each app contains 76.7 constant strings in layout fles (i.e., XML fles used to
statically defne UIs) and 151 constant strings in app code. These constant strings often
provide rich information about what is being held by the corresponding variables. For example, in Figure 3.1, method call json.getString("username") at line 28 uses a
constant string “username”. We can infer that the JSON object contains some sensitive
user Id. Since the JSON object is part of the Web server response, according to the work
fow, we can conclude that the response contains sensitive information. Thus the logging
operation at line 9 should be reported as a sensitive data disclosure.
Note that even if we recognized that the JSON object at line 28 contains sensitive information, we could not detect the disclosure problem using traditional analysis techniques
that try to fnd forward data fow from source points to sink points. We show the data fow
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via solid arrows in Figure 3.2, starting from retrieving the data from the key-value mapping (line 8). If we treat line 28 as a source point, we cannot get a forward data fow path
from the source point to the sink point. Thus the disclosure defect is still missed after we
augment traditional techniques with our new sensitive data recognition method.
B ID T EXT solves the problem by introducing bi-directional propagation. Instead of
propagating tags like tainted and untainted in traditional techniques, our approach uses the
constant strings as the tags and propagates both backward and forward. As the dashed arrows in Figure 3.2 show, constant text “username” is propagated backward from the method
call at line 28 to the variable json created at line 24, and so on. Consequently, variables
jsonArray, jsonString, data and fnally dt are tagged with the text “username”.
Intuitively, it means all these variables contain sensitive user Id information. Next we forwardly propagate the tag from line 8 to the sink point at line 9. Therefore, the logging
statement operates on variables that are associated with text “username”. By applying this
approach to the whole code snippet, we obtain the set of correlated text as {“CampaignActivity”, “Got data back:”, “data”, “avatar_url”, “username”, “created_at”, “content”}.
The frst two textual tags are associated to the variable directly at the sink point. Tag “data”
is propagated to the variable (at the logging statement) in a forward manner. The remaining
texts are propagated to the sink point via a bi-directional manner discussed above.
B ID T EXT also associates UI texts to variables. UI often contains texts that also indicate
the sensitiveness of data shown on the UI (see [43, 59]). We examine the corresponding
layout fle to get the texts, add them to the tag set of the related variables and propagate
them like the texts found in the code. In the example, we can fnd several code locations
that interact with the UI (e.g., line 33), through which we identify the corresponding layout
fles to collect UI texts. However, the content of the UI is dynamically created and none of
the UI elements holds constant texts. Therefore, no GUI texts are propagated to the sink
point in this example.
Next we apply a natural language processing (NLP) technique to the tag set of the
sink point to fnd out if the texts can tell the sensitiveness of the variable dt. Among the
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Program

p ::= s*

Statement s ::=

v := t

/*constant string in code*/

|

v := i

/*UI-related Id*/

|

v := c

/*values of other types*/

|

v := ⊖v1

/*unary assignment*/

|

v := v1 ⊕ v2

/*binary assignment*/

|

call(m,va →v f )

/*va /v f actual/formal arg*/

|

v := return(m,vr )

/*m returns vr to v*/

|

v := apicall(m,va )

/*API call to method m*/

|

IF(v) {st } ELSE {s f }

|

LOOP {s}

/*loop structure*/

|

v := f (vt , v f )

/*value merging in SSA*/

Variable

v

Method

m

String

t

ID

i

Value

c

/*Non-str, non-Id Values*/
Figure 3.3.: Language.

collected texts, “username” matches a predefned sensitive keyword. Thus our technique
reports a sensitive data disclosure problem for the logging operation at line 9.

3.3 Design
We propose B ID T EXT, a static bi-directional text correlation analysis approach, to detect sensitive data disclosures. B ID T EXT combines both the bi-directional propagation and
the new approach that uses internal constant texts to identify sensitive variables as illustrated in Section 3.2.
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3.3.1 Language Abstraction
To simplify our discussion, we introduce an abstract language. The language is presented in Figure 3.3. We only model the language features that are related to explaining
the text correlation analysis and the bi-directional propagation. Others are abstracted away
or simplifed. As we discussed in Section 3.2, we leverage the constant texts in the code as
well as in the UI to tag variables and determine whether sensitive data is disclosed at sink
points. Therefore, constant strings in the code and constant Ids that are associated with
UI are of special interest and explicitly modeled in the language. For simplicity, we do
not allow constant strings/Ids to appear in complex operations, e.g., binary operations and
method calls. For such scenarios, the constant is frst assigned to a variable, which is further
used in the complex operation. This is similar to how Android apps handle constant values
in DEX bytecode. For example, the method call json.getString("username") at
line 28 in Figure 3.1 is converted to two statements:
1 tmp = "username";
2 json.getString(tmp);

An invocation to method m(v f ) is modeled by two separate statements: call(m,va
→v f ) passing the actual argument va to the formal argument v f and v=return(m,vr)
returning the value in vr in m() to v in the caller. The separation allows us clearly model
the data fow at the entry and the exit of a method call. v := apicall(m, va ) abstracts
invocation to an API function m() whose implementation is usually excluded or not available during analysis, e.g., the runtime C library and the framework methods for Android
apps.
The language also supports conditional branches and loops. There are different loop
structures such as for loops and while loops. We ignore these differences and use a
LOOP statement to model them. Loop conditions are not relevant to our analysis and hence
not modeled. Any side effects (in the loop conditions) are explicitly modeled as assignments in the loop body.
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Our language is a kind of SSA language so that f function is used to merge values from
different branches (of a predicate). As we will show later in Section 3.3.2, f functions
require delicate consideration during bi-directional propagation.

3.3.2 Type System and Bi-directional Propagation
As discussed earlier, we use the constant texts in either the code or the UI to tag the
correlated variables and propagate the tags bi-directionally. We formalize this approach in
a type system, i.e.,the set of tags associated with a variable is treated as the type of the
variable. Since the type is a set, we also call it a type set in this paper. The mappings
from variables to their type sets form the context G of the type system, which is iteratively
updated during analysis until a fxed point is reached. For example, at the beginning, G is
empty. Upon a statement tmp = "username", G is updated to {tmp : {username}}. At
this point, we have G ⊢ tmp : {username}, which means under context G, variable tmp is
typed with set {username}. In other words, G(tmp) = {username}, where G(tmp) evaluates
variable tmp in the context to obtain the corresponding type set.
When a statement is evaluated, the context may be updated. We use G, S |= G ⇒ G′ to
indicate that under context G, evaluating statement S updates the context from G to G′ .
We use [var : T ]G to represent an update to the context. Specifcally, if no mapping is
found for variable var in context G, the mapping is added into the context. But if there
exists some mapping for var, the rule substitutes the existing type set for var with the
given type set T . Multiple mappings can be updated simultaneously, e.g., [var : T , var’ :
T ′ ]G updates the context for two variables var and var’.
Given two type sets T and T ′ , T ∪ T ′ unions the two sets while T − T ′ returns a new
type set which contains all elements belonging to T but not T ′ .
With the language in Figure 3.3 and the above defnitions, we defne the bi-directional
type set propagation rules in Figure 3.4. The propagation is iterative. That means once the
analysis starts, it does not terminate until the context G reaches a fxed point.
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Const-Binding

UI-Binding

G, v := t |= G ⇒ [v : {t}]G

resource_id(i)
G, v := i |= G ⇒ [v : extract_text(i)]G

Unary-Assignment

Binary-Assignment

Phi-Assignment

G⊢v:T

G ⊢ v1 : T1
G ⊢ v2 : T2
2
v : T ∪ T1 ∪ T2 ,
6
6
G, v := v1 ⊕ v2 |= G ⇒ 6 v1 : T1 ∪ (T − T2 ),
4
v2 : T2 ∪ (T − T1 )

3

7
7
7G
5

G⊢v:T

G ⊢ v1 : T1
G ⊢ v2 : T2
2
v : T ∪ T1 ∪ T2 ,
6
6
G, v := f (v1 , v2 ) |= G ⇒ 6 v1 : T1 ∪ (T − T2 ),
4
v2 : T2 ∪ (T − T1 )

Method-Call-Param

Method-Call-Return

API-Call

G⊢v:T
G ⊢ v1 : T ′
G, v := ⊖v1 |= G ⇒ [v : T ∪ T ′ , v1 : T ′ ∪ T ]G

G ⊢ va : T

3

7
7
7G
5

G ⊢ vf : T′

G, call(m, va → v f ) |= G ⇒ [v f : T ′ ∪ T, va : T ∪ T ′ ]G
G⊢v:T
G ⊢ vr : T ′
G, v := return(m, vr) |= G ⇒ [v : T ∪ T ′ , vr : T ′ ∪ T ]G
G ⊢ va : T ′
2

G, v := apicall(m, va ) |= G ⇒ 4

G⊢v:T
v : T ∪ model_ f wd(m, va ),
va : T ′ ∪ model_bwd(m, v)

Figure 3.4.: Bi-directional propagation rules.
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Binding Constant Value
As mentioned earlier, we focus on constant texts in the code and the constant Ids that are
associated to UI. An assignment of a constant string to a variable adds a new mapping from
the variable to a set holding the string to the context. For a constant Id, we need to make
sure the Id is indeed a resource Id (e.g., layout Id in Android apps or an Id for a specifc UI
element). This check is modeled by predicate resource_id(). If the prerequisite satisfes, updating the context is similar to the constant string assignment, except that the type
set is the extracted texts from the corresponding UI through function extract_text().
For instance, if the constant Id is associated with a typical login screen, the extracted text
set may often be {Username, Password, Login}.

Propagation for Assignment
Rule Unary-Assignment updates the context for both the LHS and RHS variables with
the union of the two separate type sets. Note that it allows the tags from LHS to propagate to
RHS and vice versa through the union operation (i.e., bi-directional propagation). Use the
statement jsonString = data at line 18 in Figure 3.1 as an example. Assume before
evaluating this statement, G(jsonString) = {avatar_url, username, created_at, content} and
G(data) = {data} via previous evaluation steps. After evaluating this statement, the type
sets for both variables jsonString and data are updated to {avatar_url, username,
created_at, content, data}. This shares some similarity with type unifcation in classic type
inference. However, as we will see next, unifcation does not properly model the intended
propagation behavior for binary operations and f functions.
For a binary assignment, we cannot simply union all the type sets of the LHS and RHS
variables and associate the resultant type set to all the variables, which is what classic type
inference would do. We observe that this is undesirable as it allows the type set of a RHS
variable to be propagated to another RHS variable while the operation does not induce any
data fow between the two variables. Intuitively, assuming the two RHS variables are v1
and v2 , v1 being associated with a sensitive tag does not entail v2 having the same sensitive
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tag (by the operation). Thus, as specifed by Rule Binary-Assignment, the propagation is
conducted as follows. The type sets of the RHS variables are unioned and inserted to the
type set of the LHS variable. Only the part of the LHS type set that is not in the type set
of v1 is propagated to v2 and only the part of the LHS type set that is not in the type set of
v2 is propagated to v1 . There is a corner case in which the two RHS variables are the same
one, e.g.,a = b ⊕ b. The updated type set for b is G(b) ∪ (G(a) − G(b)), which is equal
to G(a) ∪ G(b). In other words, this special case behaves the same as a unary assignment.
The propagation for f statements has the same nature (Rule Phi-Assignment).
We use a real example from an Android app com.mojo.animewallpaper to show how
our propagation rule for f statements eliminates false alarms. The simplifed code snippet
is shown in Figure 3.5a. If a certain condition satisfes, the device Id is assigned to variable
x at line 2. The detail of acquiring the device Id is omitted but eventually a constant string
“android_id” is added to the type set of x. If the condition doesn’t satisfy, a random value
is generated as the requested Id at line 4 and stored to variable x, which is immediately
used at a sink point at line 5. After the branch, variable x, whose value is either the real
device Id or a random value, is used elsewhere.
From the perspective of f representation, we know that right before the x is used at
line 7, we have a f statement as x@7 = f (x@2, x@4). The data fow for the several occurrences of x is described by the solid arrows in Figure 3.5b and the propagation relations
are shown by dashed arrows.
Consider a naive bi-directional propagation that simply unions all the type sets. During
the frst iteration, “android_id” is propagated to x@7 via forward propagation. Nothing
is backwardly propagated to x@2 or x@4 from x@7. Therefore, at the end of the frst
iteration, G(x@2) = G(x@7) = {android_id} and G(x@4) = 0.
/ Then during the second
iteration, if we directly propagate the type set of x@7 to both x@2 and x@4, we would
get G(x@4) = {android_id}, which is later propagated to the sink point at line 5. Thus a
sensitive data disclosure is reported which is a false alarm. In contrast, our propagation rule
supports the mutual exclusion of the type sets in the two respective branches. Specifcally,
we only backwardly propagate G(x@7) − G(x@2), i.e., an empty set, to x@4. At last, the
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1 if (...) {
2

x = getDeviceId(); // x is tagged with "android_id"

3 } else {
4

x = some_random_uuid(); // gen random value for x

5

Log.d("Random: ", x); // sink

6 }
7 use(x);
(a) Simplifed code snippet.

x@2

''

,,

'

android_id' '

x@7 = f (x@2, x@4)

x@4
,
,
,
sink@5

(b) Data fow and type propagation.

Figure 3.5.: App com.mojo.animewallpaper: code example and bi-directional propagation
for f .

type set of x@4 stays unchanged and the sink point does not observe any sensitive type for
the variable. Thus no sensitive data disclosure is reported.

Propagation for Method Calls
Propagation through a method call occurs at passing argument from the caller and returning value from the callee. Therefore, we defne two separate rules for these two events.
Note that these two rules handle method calls whose implementations are included in the
analysis. We also propose a special rule for propagation over API functions, the implementations of which are typically invisible during analysis.
Rules Method-Call-Param and Method-Call-Return union the type sets. A concrete example for rule Method-Call-Param is the instantiation call at line 10 in Figure 3.1. The
constructor at line 17 is invoked and the value held by variable dt is passed to variable
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data. Then constant value “data” associated with dt is propagated to data and “username” associated with data is backwardly propagated to dt.
Rule API-Call does not directly propagate the type sets between parameters and the
return value. B ID T EXT relies on the model for the API function for proper propagation.
Prior static taint analysis [4,35,36] have shown that it is effective to simply propagate from
all parameters to the return value and the receiver object (i.e.,this reference in instance
method calls). However, this naive approach does not work well in bi-directional propagation. We need to investigate the type correlations for the variables involved in an API call,
including all the parameters and the return value.
Some API functions may not support fully bi-directional propagation among the variables. For example, variable name can be used to type value in statement value=HashMap.get(name) but not the reverse according to the semantics. Specifcally, if name
holds some sensitive constant strings, we can infer that value may hold sensitive information, but not the other way around. If we ignore this reference, after evaluating
the statement under context G, we have G′ (name) = G(name) and G′ (value) = G(value) ∪
G(name). Many API functions, on the other hand, can be applied with the naive propagation policy, unioning the type sets of all variables. For example, we have G′ (ret) = G′ (str) =
G(ret) ∪ G(str) after evaluating statement ret = str.toUpperCase() under context
G. In the rule, the behavior depends on functions model_fwd() and model_bwd()
which defne the propagation policies from va to v and from v to va , respectively.
We formalized our approach to identifying and bi-directionally propagating constant
texts in a type system and developed a set of propagation rules based on our abstract language in Figure 3.3. While the rules are general for our language, in practice we need
to perform a number of enhancements to the rules to handle real-world language/program
features. These enhancements are discussed in next section.
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CheckAlert

::= IF(vc ) {alert(vm )}

(a) Specialized statement.
Check-Alert

G ⊢ vc : T
G ⊢ vm : T ′
G, IF(vc ){alert(vm )} |= G ⇒ [vc : T ∪ T ′ ]G
(b) Propagation rule.

Figure 3.6.: Abstraction and propagation rules for check-and-alert cases.

3.3.3 Practical Enhancements
There are two main practical enhancements to our formal model that are critical to the
effectiveness of B ID T EXT.

Check and Alert
It is common in real programs to prompt some alerts to the user or write to the log
fle if a condition check fails. In this case, we can use the alert/log message to infer what
the corresponding variables involved in the condition check may hold. For example, an
Android app can alert the user about some previous errors, e.g., some required inputs are
missing, by showing a short message on the screen. A typical implementation looks like
the following.
1 if (str == null || str.isEmpty()) {
2

Toast.makeText(this, "Please Enter Password", 1);

3 }

We can type variable str with the constant text “Please Enter Password” and propagate it through the aforementioned rules.
The abstraction and the corresponding propagation rule are shown in Figure 3.6. This
applies to a set of API functions, called the alert functions.
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String Concatenation
String concatenation is common in real-world apps. A concatenation operation may
involve both constant values and multiple variables. If we simply union the type sets of all
the involved variables and update the variables with resultant type set, we may introduce
false positives. Furthermore, the associations between the constant strings (involved in
the concatenation) and the variables (involved in the concatenation) also need to be properly identifed. A simple strategy that associates all constant strings to all variables also
produces a lot of false positives. For example, building a URL often involves multiple
variables, each holding a value as part of the HTTP request. The variables can be either
sensitive (e.g., password) or insensitive (e.g., user comment). We need to distinguish the
exact types correlated to the variables. Consider the following example, in which a typical
URL is constructed.
1 url = "http://.../login?username=" + un + "&pwd=" + p;

At the bytecode level, the above statement is converted to:
1 builder0 = new StrinBuilder("http://.../login?username=");
2 builder1 = builder0.append(un);
3 builder2 = builder1.append("&pwd=");
4 builder3 = builder2.append(p);
5 url = builder3.toString();

Assume the model for API StringBuilder.append() entails fully bi-directional
propagation, i.e., we propagate the type sets of all involved variables to each other. The
constant string “http://.../login?username=” is propagated to builder0, builder1, un,
builder2 and p. A later text analysis would indicate that both un and p are associated
with the sensitive text “username”, which is incorrect for variable p. Similarly, “&pwd=”
will be propagated to un, which causes a false alarm.
However, if we do not allow the propagation from the StringBuilder instance
(e.g., builder0) to the appended variable (e.g.,un), that is, the red and blue edges are
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Figure 3.7.: Propagation graph for a simple string concatenation.

api_w_str(m)
S ⊢ va : E
G′ = string_partition(m, E)
Str-API
G, v := apicall(m, va) |= G ⇒ G ∪ G′

Figure 3.8.: Propagation rules for string concatenation.

removed from Figure3.7, then neither “username” nor “pwd” could be propagated to un or
p. As a result, we cannot infer that these two variables may hold sensitive information.
The expected propagation, according to the semantics of the URL string, is that “username” is propagated to un, and “pwd” to p, exclusively. We observe that it is impossible
to enforce such propagation through API models (e.g., the model for append()) as an
API call may only represent a local operation that does not have the global view of the
concatenated string. To address the problem, we need to analyze the entire concatenated
string produced at the end. In our example, we ought to examine the fnal result associated
with url in order to associate the appropriate text to variables un and p. Therefore, we
need to enhance our type system with the following string analysis.
Rule Str-API in Figure 3.8 determines if an API call has a string argument va with
a well-defned format through function api_w_str(). For example, new URL(str)
is such a function as it implies the variable str is a string of the url format. If so, the
string is of interest. B ID T EXT computes an abstract string E for va , which is stored in a
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Strcat

S ⊢ v1 : E1
S ⊢ v2 : E2
S, v := strcat(v1, v2 ) |= S ⇒ [v : E1 · E2 ]S

Strcat-Nil

S ⊢ v1 : nil
S ⊢ v2 : E2
S, v := strcat(v1, v2 ) |= S ⇒ [v : v1 · E2 ]S

Str-Const-Assign

Str-If

S, v := t |= S ⇒ [v : t]S

S, st |= S ⇒ St
St ⊢ v : Et

S, s f |= S ⇒ S f
Sf ⊢ v : Ef

S, IF(∗){st }ELSE{s f } |= S ⇒ [v : Et | E f ]S

Str-LOOP-Closure

Str-LOOP-Simple

⊥, s |=⊥⇒ S′

S′ ⊢ v : v · E

S ⊢ v : E0

S, LOOP{s} |= S ⇒ [v : E0 · (E)* ]S
⊥, s |=⊥⇒ S′
S′ ⊢ v : E
v 6∈ E
S, LOOP{s} |= S ⇒ [v : E]S

Figure 3.9.: Computing abstract strings.

string context S that maps a variable to an abstract string. An abstract string is a regular
expression including both constant strings and variables. The abstract string is partitioned
by the function string_partition() so that the variables in the regular expression
are associated with the appropriate texts. For the above example, the rule produces G′
= {un : {username}, p : {pwd}}. We then combine G′ into the current context G and
further propagate the generated texts. Next, we will frst explain how the abstract strings
are computed and then the string_partition() function.
The rules for computing abstract strings are shown in Figure 3.9. The interpretation
of the rules is similar to that for our type system. One difference is that we use the string
context S instead of the type context G. Rule Strcat simply concatenates the two abstract
strings of the operands. Rule Strcat-Nil handles the case in which the frst operand does not
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have any mapping, meaning that it is a string variable encountered for the frst time. In this
case, the variable itself is concatenated to the resulting string. It is similarly handled when
the second operand does not have mapping and the rule is elided. Rule Str-Const-Assign
handles the constant string assignment.
Rule Str-If specifes that for a conditional statement, B ID T EXT computes the string
contexts for the true and false branches separately. For any variable that is present in the
string context(s), the resulting abstract string is an alternation of the abstract strings in the
branches. Consider the following code snippet.
1 if(c) {
2

str := strcat("&UserId=", uId);

3 } else {
4

str := strcat("&sessionId=", sId);

5 }

The abstract string for variable str is (“&UserId=”·uId) | (“&ses-sionId=”·sId).
Rule Str-LOOP-Closure specifes that for a loop, B ID T EXT frst computes the string
context for the loop body with an empty string context and then aggregates the resulting
abstract strings to the original string context. In particular, if the abstract string for a variable v also contains v, it indicates the resulting string has recursive structure (caused by the
loop), B ID T EXT hence associates v to a kleene closure in the context outside the loop. Tail
recursion is similarly handled. Currently, B ID T EXT only handles regular languages, which
is suffcient for most cases we encountered. Rule Str-LOOP-Simple specifes that if there
is no recursive structure, the abstract strings are simply copied from the context of the loop
body to the context outside the loop. For the following example, B ID T EXT produces the
abstract string “Output:”·(“A”)* for variable str.
1 str := "Output:";
2 for (...) {
3
4 }

str := strcat(str, "A");
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As shown by Rule Str-API, the abstract string at an API that specifes the format of the
string is partitioned to acquire the texts for the variables within the abstract string. This is
done by calling string_partition(). This function has a number of built-in parsers
that can parse the different string formats based on the API name. For example, if the
API is URL(), it uses the parser for url. Particularly, the parser searches for symbol “?”,
the part after the symbol is parsed by “([^=]*)=([^&]*)” with the frst part being the key
and the second part the value. If the key is a constant t and the value is a variable v, G is
updated with the mapping from v to t. B ID T EXT also has parsers for other formats such
as SQL queries. For example, two mappings {v1 : {password}, v2 : {userid}} can be
extracted from an abstract string denoting a SQL update “update TABLE set password=”·
v1· “ where userid=”· v2.
For the prior URL example, append() is essentially a strcat(). According to the
rules, the fnal abstract string for url is “http://.../login?username=”· un· “&pwd=”· p. It
is partitioned so that un is mapped to {username} and p is mapped to {pwd}.

3.3.4 Disclosure Analysis
After the type set computation converges, B ID T EXT checks whe-ther arguments at the
sinks points hold any sensitive data via textual analysis. If the type set information indicates
the sensitiveness of an argument, we report a potential disclosure.
The process to determine the sensitiveness of a variable with a set of associated constant texts is presented in Algorithm 2, which assumes the text set T and a set of sensitive
keywords KWD. For each collected string (i.e., word, phrase or sentence), B ID T EXT frst
conducts some preprocessing. For example, “EmailAddress” is converted to “email address”. If a string contains more than one sentence, it is split using the standard sentence
division method implemented in Stanford Parser [12]. If the string matches any keyword,
we check whether it is a single word. If so, we put the string into S which holds all sensitive
strings. S can be used to decide what sensitive information is disclosed after the algorithm
fnishes. If the string is a phrase or a sentence, we need to check if it is the negation of a
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Algorithm 2 Sensitiveness determination.
determine_sensitiveness(T , S, KWD)
1: for all t ∈ T do
2:

t ′ = preprocess(t)

3:

if t ′ matches in KWD then

4:

if t ′ is a word or t ′ doesn’t match any negation template then
S=S∪t

5:
6:
7:

end if
end if

8: end for

sensitive keyword. For example, “do not enter password here” tells the user that the input
feld should not contain any password. Even though the string matches a sensitive keyword
“password”, we do not consider it sensitive. So if the corresponding variable does not have
any other associated sensitive texts, it is treated insensitive and the sink does not have a
sensitive data disclosure problem.
We use Stanford Parser [12] to parse a phrase or a sentence into a syntax tree, which
is then converted to a dependency relation (please refer to [63]). Based on the dependency
relation, B ID T EXT searches the negation word “not” and then checks the auxiliary word
right before the negation word. It also examines if there exists a subject noun word before
the auxiliary word. By combining the auxiliary word and the possible subject word, B ID T EXT can identify whether the phrase/sentence is imperative or declarative. For example,
“do not” and “you should not” are imperative negations but “you did not” is declarative
negation. B ID T EXT only considers the imperative negation as a negation (of sensitive keyword). In such cases, the text is not sensitive.

3.4 Implementation
We implemented B ID T EXT to detect sensitive data disclosures in Android apps. B ID T EXT is built on top of WALA [28], which parses the Android DEX bytecode to interme-
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diate representations. We implemented the algorithm in [3] to collect possible entry points
(e.g.,onCreate for an activity) in the target Android app. For each entry point, B ID T EXT
builds the call graph and the dependency graph. The constant strings are propagated on the
graphs. We do not distinguish the correlated text for each UI element as in [59]. Instead,
all elements in one layout fle are associated with all the texts found in that layout fle.
B ID T EXT relies on a keyword set to determine the sensitiveness of computed texts.
To acquire the keyword set, we ran B ID T EXT on 2,000 randomly selected apps and extracted all texts discovered for each sink. We then manually inspected these texts to construct the keyword set. In order to detect traditional data closures that are due to datafow between source APIs and sink APIs instead of texts, we assign some sensitive textual keywords to the source APIs that must expose sensitive information so that B ID T EXT
can propagate the keywords. For example, we assign “imei” to API TelephonyManager.getDeviceId().
We leverage Stanford Parser [12] as the engine for analyzing phrases and sentences.
B ID T EXT currently only supports English.
For better effciency, B ID T EXT also performs on the fy type set reduction. Specifcally,
when a text set reaches a certain size, garbage collection is conducted by fltering out the
texts in the type set that do not indicate sensitiveness and those that are redundant.

3.5 Evaluation
All experiments are performed on an Intel Core i7 3.4GHz machine with Ubuntu 12.04.
The task of analyzing each app is given the maximum memory of 10GB and the maximum
analysis time of 20 minutes. The subjects are a collection of 10,000 Android apps downloaded from Google Play in March 2015. The sink points used in the evaluation contain
all the logging operations in Android and the Apache HTTP access APIs that are commonly used in Android apps. This is also the standard setup for many existing static taint
analysis [40, 59]. The other types of sink points can be easily added to B ID T EXT.
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3.5.1 Pilot Study
As discussed earlier, B ID T EXT heavily relies on accurate propagation models for API
method calls. However, Android framework contains thousands of API functions, making
it almost infeasible to manually build the models for all API functions. Our approach is to
randomly select 2,000 apps and run B ID T EXT on these apps. Then we inspect the results to
discover popular API functions and create models only for those functions. These models
are later used in the larger scale study.
During the pilot study, we also observe a kind of false positive that appears frequently.
It is caused by a Facebook library used by many apps. The library logs an error message
when it fails to obtain the device Id. The code snippet is abstracted as follows.
1 try {
2

/* acquire device id */

3 } catch (Exception e) {
4

Utility.logd("android_id", e);

5 }

The message e is typed with “android_id”, which is a sensitive keyword. But the meaning
of this message is indeed that the action of acquiring the device Id fails. Solving this issue
requires in-depth semantic analysis of e which is not supported by B ID T EXT. Since the
pattern is fxed, we post-process all the reports to flter out this pattern for both the pilot
study and the later large scale study.

3.5.2 Unifcation vs. Bi-directional Propagation
In classic type inference, given an assignment statement such as z=x+y and z=f (x,y),
the updated type sets of x, y, and z are the union of all three original type sets. In Section 3.3.2 (Rules Binary-Assignment and Phi-Assignment in Figure 3.4), we mentioned
that such a unifcation based approach may produce a lot of false positives and hence B ID T EXT makes use of a bi-directional propagation strategy that avoids propagating type sets
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between right-hand-side operands (i.e.,x and y in the example). In this experiment, we
want to compare these two propagation strategies.
Due to the lack of ground truth, such a study requires manually inspecting the reported
disclosure defects and determining if they are false positives. Among the 2000 apps tested
in the pilot study, we selected the frst 60 apps whose data disclosure path (i.e., the data fow
subgraph that includes the path from the source to the sink and the path that the sensitive
text is propagated from its origin to the sink) involves f statements and/or binary operations
with the unifcation based propagation policy. We re-run B ID T EXT on the 60 apps with the
bi-directional propagation policy and compare the two sets of results.
Among these 60 apps, 42 of them are reported by both the unifcation policy and the bidirectional policy; 25 of them contains fows only reported by the unifcation policy. Note
that the two do not add up to 60 because some apps have multiple reported disclosures,
some being reported by both policies and the others being only reported by the unifcation
policy. We manually studied the 25 cases reported by the unifcation policy and found that
they are all false positives. We have shown one sample false positive in Section 3.3.2.

3.5.3 Large Scale Evaluation
In this experiment, we use 10,000 apps not covered by the pilot study. The apps have a
minimum size of 6.46KB for the APK fles and a maximum size of 49.94MB. The average
size of the APK fles is 9.17MB. Among these apps, there are two that do not contain any
DEX bytecode in the APK fles. For the remaining apps, the minimum size of the bytecode
fles (classes.dex) is 452 bytes and the maximum size is 10.32MB. The average size
of the bytecode fles is 2.53MB.

Results
The total analysis time for the 10,000 apps is 587.6 hours. Figure 3.10 presents the
distribution of the cumulative analysis time for all the 10,000 apps. We divide the total
analysis time into three parts according to how the analysis on an app terminates. As
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Figure 3.10.: Distribution of accumulative analysis time for all apps.
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Figure 3.11.: Distribution for the analysis time (in minutes) of the apps reported with sensitive data disclosures.
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Figure 3.12.: Breakdown of the reported apps.

mentioned above, we set the analysis timeout to 20 minutes for each app. In our evaluation,
856 apps (8.56%) time out and the total analysis time account for 49% of the total time
consumed for the 10,000 apps. We have 293 other apps of which the analysis ran out of
memory. The total time for these apps accounts for 9%. For the remaining 8,852 apps that
fnished normally take only 42% of the total analysis time. Observe in Figure 3.10 that the
frst 7,500 apps take less than 15% of the total time. Among the 8,852 apps, the minimum
analysis time is 0.2 seconds and the maximum time is 1197.4 seconds. The median is 24.9
seconds while the average time is 99.9 seconds. The largest app that terminates normally
has the APK size of 49.94MB, and the bytecode size of 10.32MB.
Overall, B ID T EXT reports 4,406 apps with sensitive data disclosure problems. We
show the analysis time distribution of these apps in Figure 3.11. The blue bars show the
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Figure 3.13.: Comparing B ID T EXT with static tainting (tracking specifc APIs) and SUPOR [59].

number of apps that fnished within a time period. For instance, 472 apps took more than
5 minutes but less than 10 minutes. We also see that 27 apps timed out in the experiments,
although partial results were collected before the analysis terminated. The red line presents
the cumulative analysis time: 93.0% of the apps were analyzed within 10 minutes. We can
conclude that B ID T EXT is effcient to be applied to market-scaled apps.
We also show the breakdown of the 4,406 apps by the sources of data disclosures in
Figure 3.12a.
There are three types of sources: (1) TEXT – constant texts in the code that denote
sensitive data; (2) API – sensitive API (recall that B ID T EXT also detects data disclosures
originating from sensitive APIs by associated artifcial texts to the source APIs such as
Location.getLatitude()); and (3) UI – constant texts retrieved from user interfaces
that denote sensitive data. Observe that the majority of disclosures are/can be detected by
the sensitive text labels. Some data disclosure defects can be recognized through multiple
sources (e.g., TEXT+API), meaning that there are some (bi-directional) data fow paths
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from a sensitive API to a sink and from some constant text to the same sink. Consider
the following example. The data fow path 2→6→7 denotes a disclosure originating from
TEXT (i.e., “android_id”) and the path 4→6→7 denotes a disclosure originating from API
(i.e., “getDeviceId()”).
1 if (fails_to_obtain_imei()) {
2

id = Settings.Secure.getString(resolver, "android_id");

3 } else {
4

id = telephonyManager.getDeviceId();

5 }
6 json.putString("id", id);
7 http_sink(json.toString()); // sink

The breakdown of the apps by the sink types is shown in Figure 3.12b. Note that 64.9%
of the reported apps contain disclosures due to logging. Although data disclosure through
logging is substantially mitigated by access control in the latest version of Android, it is still
a security concern for legacy Android systems such that most existing works [9, 35, 36, 59]
report these disclosures. About 38.3% of the reported apps (16.9% of all the apps evaluated)
contain sensitive data disclosures due to to non-logging sinks. They are serious threats even
in the latest Android systems.
Figure 3.13 shows how B ID T EXT compares with an implementation of the traditional
taint tracking technique (tracking disclosures from source APIs through forward data-fow
similar to [4]) and SUPOR [59], which is a technique that tracks disclosures from sensitive UI elements (e.g., input boxes) through forward data-fow. B ID T EXT always reports a
super-set of those reported by the classic tainting and SUPOR. In the fgure, the numbers of
apps reported by tainting and SUPOR are normalized to those reported by B ID T EXT. Observe that they only report 17.5% and 53.9% of those reported by B ID T EXT, respectively.
Even combining the two can only detect 64.0%. If only taking non-logging disclosures
into account, they report 15.3% and 60.4% of those reported by B ID T EXT. This attributes
to both the new text label correlation analysis and the bi-directional type set propagation
strategy.
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Figure 3.14.: Length distribution of the emitted paths for the reported apps. X-axis shows
the length of the paths.

We present the length distribution of the emitted data disclosure paths for the 4,406
apps in Figure 3.14. Though some paths tend to be very long (more than 80 elements),
most of them are relatively short. More than 75% of the paths require less than 30 steps
from the origination of the sensitive texts to the sink points.
False Positives and False Negatives. It is critical to understand the quality of the reported
defects. Due to the lack of ground truth, we had to perform manual inspection. Studying
the full set of results is infeasible. Hence, we randomly chose 100 reported apps with a
uniform size distribution for manual inspection. The results are presented in Table 3.1.
The columns indicate the sources of the disclosures. Row Total shows the total number
of reported apps for each sources. Row Only shows the number of apps that only have
reported disclosures falling into one category. The last row shows the number of false
positives.
Observe that the 10 false positives are exclusive. Therefore, the false positive rate is
10%. The causes for false positives will be discussed in Section 3.5.3. We do not count the
false negatives because we don’t have the ground truth.
Among the 84 apps where disclosures are reported by code text analysis, 62 apps contain paths that can be only detected by our approach via text correlation analysis, i.e., the
data used at sink points neither come from any UI inputs nor from traditional source APIs.
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Table 3.1.: Manually inspected evaluation results for 100 apps.

II TEXT I API I UI I

I
Total

84

22

39

Only

44

2

14

3

0

7

FP

In other words, 62 of them cannot be detected by classic tainting or SUPOR. This ratio is
consistent with that in Figure 3.13 for the larger experiment. The other reported disclosures
have the sensitive data coming from these two categories of sources. They are reported by
both B ID T EXT and the existing technique(s). Another interesting fnding is that B ID T EXT
often produces a shorter disclosure path. A typical scenario is that there is a long data fow
path from a UI input element to a sink. However, mid way through the path, the (sensitive)
data is put/get to/from some container with a sensitive textual key, which allows B ID T EXT
to report a shorter path from the put/get operation to the sink. The benefts of shorter paths
are two-folded: less human efforts needed for inspection and detecting more disclosures
(because the full path from the source points to the sink points might be complicated, involving inter-component communications, such that the tool may fail to traverse the full
path).

Case Studies
We observe many cases in which sensitive textual keys appear together with data in keyvalue operations, e.g., constructing a name value pair (e.g.,com.gunsound.eddy.fafapro),
inserting data into a hash map (e.g.,me.tango.fshepic), retrieving/adding data to persistent
storage through an instance of SharedPreferences (e.g., com.ifreeindia.sms_mazaa)
or putting data into a JSON object (e.g., com.mobilegustro.war.battle.air.force). B ID T EXT
recognizes the sensitiveness of corresponding data via text correlation analysis.
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In the following, we show a code snippet adopted from app com.-pro.fnd.differences
that discloses sensitive device information to Web servers.
1 void obtainDeviceInfo() {
2

TCore.aid = Settings.Secure.getString(resolver,
"android_id");

3 }
4 void connectWebServer() {
5

Map map = new HashMap();

6

safePut(map, "android_id", TCore.aid);

7

String params = convertURLParams(map); // omitted

8

http_sink(params); // sink

9 }
10 void safePut(Map map, String k, String v) {
11

map.put(k, v);

12 }

The method call at line 2 returns system information based on the given key value.
For example, a unique Id for the device is obtained if “android_id” is given as the key. If
the key is “enabled_input_methods”, the return value contains a list of input methods that
are currently enabled. Therefore, the sensitiveness of the return value depends on the key.
B ID T EXT works by correlating the textual key with the return variable to decide whether a
later sink operation involves sensitive data or not.
In the above example, the variable TCore.aid is typed with the constant text “android_id” at line 2, which is later propagated to parameter v of method safePut() at
line 10. v is inserted into the hash map at line 11. Note that “android_id” at line 6 is
propagated to k@10 which is further propagated to the hash map and variable v according
to the corresponding API model for propagation. Along the data fow, the constant text
is propagated to params@7 that is eventually used at the sink point at line 8. B ID T EXT
reports the data disclosure.
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False Positives
One of the 10 false positives is caused by unmodeled API functions. The corresponding
code snippet is from app at.zuggabecka.-radiofm4.
1 uidx = cursor.getColumnIndex("username");
2 iidx = cursor.getColumnIndex("_id");
3 id = cursor.getLong(iidx);
4 sink(id);

At line 1, a sensitive keyword “username” is correlated with the receiver object cursor that is related to a database query. Then all uses of cursor propagate the text label
to other variables, e.g., the return value of a relevant method call. Thus, id at line 3 is
typed with “username”. Later when it is used at a sink point, B ID T EXT reports a sensitive
data disclosure after analyzing the corresponding type set. To remove this false alarm, we
can build a model for API Cursor.getColumnIndex(key) to only propagate type
set from key to the return value, avoiding propagating to the receiver object. Then in the
above code snippet, only variable uidx@1 is typed with “username”. Variable id that
appears at the sink point is only typed with “_id” which is not considered as a sensitive
keyword. Therefore there is no disclosure problem with the model.
All the other nine false positives are caused by incorrect recognition of text, two for
code text and seven for UI text.
App com.netcosports.andalpineski contains a text label “Apps-_lang[apps_lng_iso2]”
which indicates the language of the app. However, it contains a predefned sensitive keyword “lng” which is mostly used as an abbreviation of “longitude”. Failing to understand
the meaning of the text, B ID T EXT incorrectly reports a sensitive data disclosure.
App com.wactiveportsmouthcollege has a UI text of “Pin to desktop” where sensitive
keyword “Pin” is used as a verb. Failing to understand it leads to a false positive. All
other false positives have similar causes – sensitive keywords in a phrase or sentence do
not indicate any sensitive information. Possible solutions for this type of false positives
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include integrating more advanced NLP techniques with program analysis to understand
the meanings of the text.

3.5.4 Discussion
One limitation of B ID T EXT lies in that the text in code may not be in a generalized
format. For example, some developers use “lng” for “longitude” whereas others use “long”
for it, which is a more general word in English. If we treat “long” as a sensitive keyword,
we can expect many false positives. In addition, developers tend to combine several words
(or abbreviations) into a single word, which makes it more diffcult to determine whether
the correlated data are sensitive or not.
In the future, we plan to improve our approach in the following aspects. The frst
one is to discover text labels in the names of method calls, if they are not obfuscated, and
variable/feld names. The second improvement is to consider code comments if source code
is available. The third one is to improve the NLP aspect by putting the keywords in their
program context. Doing so, we may be able to recognize “long” indeed means longitude.

3.6 Related Work
A lot of prior research has focused on detecting sensitive data disclosures, either statically or dynamically, for mobile apps [1, 4, 31, 35, 36, 64]. Most of them consider specifc
APIs as sensitive source points while B ID T EXT analyzes text labels to determine if a variable can hold sensitive data. S U S I [37] gives a comprehensive list of the data sources in
Android, but it does not assume the data obtained from the sources must be sensitive. In
addition, even if the state-of-the-art static detectors, e.g., FlowDroid [35, 36] and DroidSafe [64], had been enhanced with various ways of determining data sensitiveness, they
would likely not be able to detect some sensitive data disclosures reported by B ID T EXT
such as our motivating example, where the sensitiveness of the data is determined after the
sink point and there is no forward data-fow from the sensitiveness revelation point and
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the sink point. B ID T EXT, however, leverages bi-directional propagation to address this
problem.
Huang et al. developed type-based taint analysis to detect information leaks in Javabased Web applications and Android apps via type inference [65, 66]. They abstract the
information fow analysis into a type system and check if any type error occurs. Their technique scales well without using advanced points-to analysis [35, 36, 64]. Their technique
still follows the traditional defnition of data disclosure, which is a forward data fow path
from the source to the sink. In other words, it does not propagate data sensitiveness in a
backward fashion. As such, it may not be able to report many disclosures reported by B ID T EXT, including the motivating example. Furthermore, their type system does not leverage
text information. Ernst et al. also developed a type-based taint analysis system [67]. Their
technique associates a few (security) types such as LOCATION, INTERNET, and SMS to
sources and sinks and have a set of predefned policies such as LOCATION can only be
compatible, or type-checked, with INTERNET. So if LOCATION reaches a program point
with the SMS type, a leak is reported. Their fow analysis is forward whereas B ID T EXT is
bi-directional. And B ID T EXT leverages text labels.
SUPOR [59] and UIPicker [43] discover sensitive information on user interface through
static analysis. However, they essentially belong to the traditional forward data-fow based
techniques. AsDroid [40] collects the set of API calls in an event handler and compares
the meaning of these API calls with the UI text of the event to detect unwanted/unexpected
app behavior. In contrast, B ID T EXT types individual variables in the program with text
labels and leverages a type system that allows bi-directional propagation. Researchers also
combine code and comment analysis to detect bugs or inconsistencies [68–70]. We envision comment analysis can leverage our bi-directional type system so that the information
in comments can be leveraged to analyze fne-grained and in-depth app behavior. In addition, W HYPER [7] and AutoCog [8] apply NLP techniques to app’s descriptions to obtain
a comprehensive view of the app and check if the required permissions are appropriately
specifed in the descriptions. Besides, [71] and [72] apply NLP techniques on API descrip-
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tions or documents to infer method specifcations. We can leverage these techniques to
automate the generation of API models used in B ID T EXT.

3.7 Summary
We propose B ID T EXT, a novel static technique to detect sensitive data disclosures.
B ID T EXT identifes text labels appearing in both code and UI, treats them as types, associates them to the corresponding variables, bi-directionally propagates the types through
data fow and eventually attributes them to sink points that potentially disclose sensitive
information. At the end, the parameters at the sink points have type sets of correlated texts.
Textual analysis is applied to the type sets to determine if the variables may hold sensitive
data. We implement B ID T EXT and preliminarily evaluate it on 10,000 apps downloaded
from Google Play store. The preliminary results show the false positive rate is 10%.

80

4

ASDROID: DETECTING STEALTHY BEHAVIORS IN ANDROID

APPLICATIONS BY USER INTERFACE AND PROGRAM BEHAVIOR
CONTRADICTION
Android smartphones are becoming increasingly popular. The open nature of Android allows users to install miscellaneous applications, including the malicious ones, from thirdparty marketplaces without rigorous sanity checks. A large portion of existing malwares
perform stealthy operations such as sending short messages, making phone calls and HTTP
connections, and installing additional malicious components. In this paper, we propose a
novel technique to detect such stealthy behavior. We model stealthy behavior as the program behavior that mismatches with user interface, which denotes the user’s expectation of
program behavior. We use static program analysis to attribute a top level function that is
usually a user interaction function with the behavior it performs. Then we analyze the text
extracted from the user interface component associated with the top level function. Semantic mismatch of the two indicates stealthy behavior. To evaluate AsDroid, we download a
pool of 182 apps that are potentially problematic by looking at their permissions. Among
the 182 apps, AsDroid reports stealthy behaviors in 113 apps, with 28 false positives and
11 false negatives.

4.1 Introduction
Android smartphones are becoming increasingly popular. Gartner’s analysis shows that
72.4% of smartphones are based on Android [73]. A prominent characteristic of Android
phones is that users can easily install miscellaneous apps downloaded from third-party marketplaces without jail-breaking. However, the downside is that Google and other vendors
can hardly control the quality of apps on third-party marketplaces. Adversaries can submit
their malicious apps and tempt users to install with various lures. Juniper Networks Mobile
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Threat Center reported a dramatic growth in Android malware population from roughly 400
samples in June 2011 [74] to 175,000 in the third quarter of 2012 [75]. Most are present on
third-party marketplaces.
A very popular category of Android malware features steal-thy malicious operations
such as making phone calls, sending SMS messages to premium-rate numbers, making
undesirable HTTP connections and installing other malicious components. It was reported
by three recent studies [19,76,77] that 52-64% of existing malwares send stealthy premiumrate SMS messages or make phone calls. Note that these actions cause unexpected charges
to phone bills [78, 79]. It was observed that stealthy HTTP requests are also very common
undesirable behavior in malwares [76]. Besides leaking user information, they could also
cause unexpected data plan consumption. In China, it was reported in March 2012 that
more than 210,000 Chinese mobile devices were affected by a kind of malwares that could
make stealthy HTTP connections inducing charges. They caused around 8 million dollars
loss [80].
Despite the pressing need, detecting such malware is challenging as the malicious behavior appears to be indistinguishable from that of benign apps. For example, an online
shopping app usually provides operation interfaces to help users conveniently call a service
number or send a query SMS message. Apps providing travel-aid and adult content often
allow users to make phone calls or send messages. Many benign apps allow establishing
background HTTP connections (e.g. weather, stock trading and gaming apps). Many also
allow users to install additional components.
Existing techniques are insuffcient in detecting/preventing stealthy malicious behaviors. A very important protection mechanism on Android is to allow users to perform
access control by setting application privileges. However, the access control is very coarsegrained. For example, the SMS messaging capability can either be enabled or completely
disabled. It is hard to decide if we should disable for a given app as many benign apps do
send SMS messages. Taint analysis [1, 4, 35, 36] allows detecting information leak in apps.
But the stealthy behavior in malwares may not leak any private information. Recently,
Google provides the capability of blacklisting certain premium-rate phone numbers [81],
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which provides a potential way of preventing stealthy SMS messages or phone calls. However, keeping such a blacklist up-to-date is a non-trivial challenge. In some countries such
as China, there is no difference between a premium-rate number and a regular phone number.
In this chapter, we propose a novel technique to detect stealthy malicious behaviors
in Android apps. We model stealthy behavior as the program behavior mismatches with
user interface. The intuition is that user interface (UI) represents the user’s expectation of
program behavior. Hence, it can naturally serve as an oracle to detect behind-the-scene behavior. For example, an SMS message send triggered by a user interaction that is supposed
to set the background color should be considered malicious. The technique consists of two
components. One is the static program analysis component that attributes the behavior of
interest (e.g. SMS send and HTTP connection) to a top level function with associated UI
(e.g. the onClick() function of a button). The other is the UI analysis component that
makes use of text analysis to analyze the intent described by the corresponding interface
artifacts (e.g. the text associated with the button). Any mismatch will be reported as potentially malicious. In the program analysis component, we classify Android APIs into
different groups. Each group is assigned an intent type such as SMS send and phone calls.
Reachability analysis is performed on control fow graph (CFG) and call graph (CG) to
propagate such intents from the API call sites to top level functions. Note that in event
driven programming, an invocation of a top level function usually denotes an action or a
task that can be considered as a natural unit to reason about stealthiness. The interface
analysis component identifes the text of the UI artifact associated with a top level function. Then compatibility check is performed between the intents from program analysis
and those extracted from the interface text.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We propose a method to detect Android malware that performs stealthy operations
including SMS message send, phone calls, HTTP connections and component installations. It is based on the novel idea of detecting mismatches between program
behavior and user interface.
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• We found that in many cases even though there is no direct match between an API
intent (e.g. SMS send) and the UI text, the API may be correlated with other APIs
that explicitly expose the behavior (e.g. an API call that logs the SMS send to the
mail box). In such cases, the behavior should not be considered stealthy. We propose
an in-depth analysis that considers program dependences between APIs to identify
their correlations and hence improve precision.
• We formally present our design using datalog rules. The design handles a number of
Android-specifc challenges.
• We implement a prototype called AsDroid (Anti-Stealth Droid). We collect a pool of
182 apps that have the permissions to perform the malicious operations of interest.
AsDroid reports that 113 of them have stealthy behaviors, with 28 false positives and
11 false negatives.

4.2 Motivating Example
We use a real application Qiyu to motivate our technique. It is a location-based social
networking service application on Android. Some relevant code snippets are shown in
Figure 4.1 and part of the corresponding call graph is in Figure 4.2. The entry function
onClick() (at line 2) is the handler of a button with text “One-Click Register
& Login”. The scenario is as follows. When the user clicks the button, the app checks
the current environmental settings. In most cases, the true branch is taken, in which an
asynchronous task is appended to the task queue and executed (line 5). This causes an
indirect invocation to a predefned handler doInBackground() at line 11, which is
always implicitly called by the Android runtime to perform some background processing
when a task starts to execute. The function transitively calls method A() (in class Woa.BA)
at line 17. The method connects to a website through HttpClient.execute() at
line 18 to perform registration or login. The chain of function calls is also shown on the
left of Figure 4.2. When the test at line 3 fails, the else branch (line 6) is taken. A different
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1 // In class Qiyu.StartPageActivity
2 public void onClick(View v){
3

if(/*test environment*/){

4

Woa.F f = new Woa.F(v, this);

5

f.execute(new String[0]);//trigger line 11

6

} else ...{

7
8

Woa.AG.B();//invoke line 21
}

9 }
10 // In class Woa.F
11 public Object doInBackground(Object[] objs){
12

//transitively calls Woa.BA.A() at line 17

13 }
14 // In class Woa.BA
15 private org.apache.http.client.HttpClient h;
16 private org.apache.http.client.methods.HttpGet d;
17 public void A(){
18

this.h.execute(this.d); //HttpClient.execute(...)

19 }
20 // In class Woa.AG
21 public static void B(){
22

Woa.U u = new Woa.U();

23

u.execute(...);//transitively calls C() at line 26

24 }
25 // In class Woa.AK
26 public static boolean C(Context c, String s1, String s2){
27

SmsManager sm = SmsManager.getDefault();

28

sm.sendTextMessage(s1, null, s2, null, null);

29 }

Figure 4.1.: Simplifed code snippet for app Qiyu.
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Figure 4.2.: Call graph and intent propagation in app Qiyu.

chain of function invocations are made, eventually leading to an SMS message being sent
inside method C() (in class Woa.AK) at line 28 without the user’s awareness. The chain
is shown on the right of Figure 4.2. Note that we omit three function calls between the
asynchronous task execution at line 23 and method C() for brevity.
To detect stealthy behaviors, our program analysis component frst attributes top level
functions with intents by analyzing the operations of interest directly or transitively performed by such functions. We classify Android APIs to a few pre-defned intent types.
In this example, HttpClient.execute() at line 18 denotes the HttpAccess intent
and SmsManager.sendTextMessage() at line 28 denotes the SendSms intent. The
intents get propagated upward along the call edges (see Figure 4.2) and eventually aggregated on the top level node onClick(), which is a user interaction function, suggesting
the operations performed by this function should refect what the UI states. The UI analysis
component identifes the UI artifacts corresponding to the onClick() function, i.e. the
button and its residence dialog. It further extracts the text on these interface artifacts and
performs text analysis to identify a set of keywords. In this example, they are “Register” and “Login”. AsDroid looks-up the compatibility of the keywords and the intents
identifed by the program analysis component from a dictionary generated before-hand in a

86
training phase. In this case, the HttpAccess intent is compatible but SendSms is not. Our
tool hence reports the contradiction.
There are cases that multiple intents of a top level function are correlated. For example,
a dialog may be popped up after a SMS message send to indicate the success of the send,
even though the button that initiates the send does not have any textual hint about sending
messages. In this case, the SMS send is not stealthy. The display of a dialog has the UiOperation intent. Both the UiOperation and SendSms intents reach the top level function.
We hence analyze if the intents are correlated by analyzing their program dependences.
Since UiOperation is not stealthy, the correlation between the UiOperation and SendSms
intents suggests the sanity of the SMS send behavior.

4.3 Design
In this section, we frst defne six types of intents that are of our interest. The corresponding APIs are commonly used in Android apps.
SendSms. This intent corresponds to SMS send APIs, including sendTextMessage(),
sendDataMessage() and sendMultipartTextMessage() declared in the class
SmsManager. These API functions are usually executed in the background. An SMS send
through a separated messaging app is not taken into consideration in this research because
it requires the user to explicitly interact with the messaging app to fnish the process and
hence is not stealthy.
PhoneCall. It corresponds to a direct phone call, namely, invoking startActivity()
with action android.intent.action.CALL. Malware can leverage the automated
calling mechanism to dial a number without the user’s awareness. Phone calls can also be
made through startActivity() with an action android.intent.action.DIAL.
However, we do not model this API because explicit user approval is needed when the API
is used.
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HttpAccess. This intent describes HTTP access APIs. It includes URL.openStream(),
URL.openConnection(), AbstractHttpClient.execute(), etc.. HTTP access is commonly used in Android apps for a wide range of purposes.
Install. It describes API functions that are for installing other components or applications.
Many Android malwares have their payload as installing another piece of malicious code.
Benign apps may also need to perform installation, which is however usually authorized
or explicitly guided by the user. Modeled functions include Runtime.exec() with
"pm install" as the argument, and ProcessBuilder.start() using "pm" and
"install" to build a new process.
SmsNotify. In some cases, the user does not need to (or cannot) authorize a message send
operation. But after the operation, the app may automatically notify the user that there was
an SMS send. In this case, we should not consider the message send as a stealthy action
even though the user interface that leads to the SMS send operation does not have any textual implication of the operation. One typical example is that a copy of the message is saved
to the user’s mail-box to record what just happened. Hence, we model the following API
to the SmsNotify intent: ContentResolver.insert() and the destination table is
given by a URL “content://sms”. It means inserting data into the preloaded database
for short messages.
UiOperation. A top level user interaction function may display more user interface elements to allow further interactions with the user. In some cases, UI display operations
may be correlated to some of the aforementioned intents. For example, a dialog may be
popped up after an SMS send to notify the user about the send. In such cases, the SMS
send is not stealthy. To reason about these cases, we associate the UI display API functions
such as ImageView.setImageBitmap(), View.setBackgroundDrawable()
and AlertDialog$Builder.setMessage(), with the UiOperation intent.
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4.3.1 Intent Propagation
In this section, we describe how intents are propagated to top level functions such that
we can check compatibility with the corresponding UI text. We also describe how to detect
correlation between intents. Intent propagation is based on call graph. The calling convention of Android apps has its unique features, which need to be properly handled. Intent
correlation analysis is mainly based on program dependences. However, correlated intents
do not simply mean there are (transitive) dependences between them.
The analysis is formally described in the datalog language [82], which is a Prolog-like
notation for relation computation. It provides a representation for data fow analysis in the
form of formulated relations. The inference rules on these relations are shown in Figure 4.3
and Figure 4.4. Relations are in the form p(X1 , X2 , ..., Xn ) with p being a predicate. X1 ,
X2 , ..., Xn are terms of variables or constants. In our context, variables are essentially
program artifacts such as statements, program variables and function calls. A predicate is a
declarative statement on the variables. For example, inFunction(F,L) denotes if a statement
with label L is in function F.
Rules express logic inferences with the following form.
H :- B1 & B2 & ... & Bn
H and B1 , B2 ,...Bn are either relations or negated relations. We should read the :- symbol
as “if”. The meaning of a rule is if B1 , B2 ,...Bn are true then H is true.
Relations can be either inferred or atoms. We often start with a set of atoms that are
basic facts derived from the compiler and then infer the other more interesting relations
through our analysis. We use WALA [28] as the underlying analysis infrastructure. We
leverage its single static assignment (SSA) representation, control fow graph, part of call
graph, and the MAY-points-to analysis to provide the atoms.
Atom apiIntent(L,T ) denotes an intent T is associated with an API call at L, refecting
our API classifcation. Atom hasDefFreePath(L1 ,L2 ,X ) indicates there is a program path
from program point L1 to L2 and along the path (not including L1 or L2 ), variable X may
not be defned. This is to compute the defUse(L1 , L2 ) relation that denotes if a variable is
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apiIntent(L,T )

: API call at program point L has intent type T .

def (L,X )

: variable X is defned at program point L.

use(L,X )

: variable X is used at program point L.

actual(L,M,X )

: variable X is the Mth actual argument at call site L.

formal(F,M,X )

: variable X is the Mth formal argument of function F().

inFunction(F,L)

: program point L is in function F().

funEntry(F,L)

: program point L is the entry of function F().

hasDefFreePath(L1,L2 ,X ) : there is a path from L1 to L2 along which X may not be
defned.
componentEntry(X ,F)

: F() is the entry of Android component X . e.g. onCreate()
of an Activity or a Service component.

immediateCD(L1 ,L2 )

: program point L2 is immediately control dependent on
L1 in the same function.

directInvoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

: F1 invokes F2 at program point L

indirectInvoke(F1 ,F2 )

: F2 is the actual destination of F1 () in eventdriven circumstances, e.g.

(1) Thread.start() →

Runnable.run(); (2) Handler.sendMessage() → Handler.handleMessage().
iccInvoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

: F1 invokes a function F2 for inter-component communication purpose at L. F2 should be APIs like startActivity(), startService().

Figure 4.3.: Datalog atoms for intent propagation and correlation.
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/*invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L): F1 invokes F2 at program point L.*/
invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

:- directInvoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

:- iccInvoke(F1 ,F3 ,L) & actual(L,1,X ) & “L1 : X.setClass(...)”
& actual(L1 ,2,Y ) & componentEntry(Y ,F2 )

invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

:- invoke(F1 ,F3 ,L) & indirectInvoke(F3 ,F2 )

invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L)

:- invoke(F1 ,F3 ,L) & invoke(F3 ,F2 ,L)

/*hasIntent(F,T ,L): F() has intent type T and the corresponding API call is at L.*/
hasIntent(F,T ,L)

:- invoke(F,A,L) & apiIntent(L,T )

hasIntent(F,T ,L1 )

:- hasIntent(F1 ,T ,L1 ) & invoke(F,F1 ,L2 )

/*controlDep(L1,L2 ): program point L2 is control dependent on L1 .*/
controlDep(L1,L2 )

:- immediateCD(L1 ,L2 )

controlDep(L1,L2 )

:- inFunction(F1,L1 ) & inFunction(F2,L2 ) & invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L3 )
& controlDep(L1,L3 )

/*defUse(L1 ,L2 ), useUse(L1 ,L2 ): data at L1 and L2 are data correlated.*/
defUse(L1 ,L2 )

:- def (L1 ,X ) & use(L2 ,X ) & hasDefFreePath(L1,L2 ,X )

defUse(L1 ,L2 )

:- invoke(F1 ,F2 ,L1 ) & actual(L1 ,M,X ) & formal(F2 ,M,Y ) & funEntry(F2 ,L3 ) & hasDefFreePath(L3 ,L2 ,Y ) & use(L2 ,Y )

useUse(L1 ,L2 )

:- defUse(L3 ,L1 ) & defUse(L3 ,L2 )

useUse(L2 ,L1 )

:- defUse(L3 ,L1 ) & defUse(L3 ,L2 )

/*correlated(L1,L2 ): L1 and L2 are data/control correlated.*/
correlated(L1 ,L2 )

:- controlDep(L1 ,L2 )

correlated(L1 ,L2 )

:- defUse(L1 ,L2 )

correlated(L1 ,L2 )

:- useUse(L1 ,L2 )

correlated(L1 ,L2 )

:- correlated(L1 ,L3 ) & correlated(L3 ,L2 )

/*correlatedIntent(F,T1 ,L1 ,T2 ,L2 ): In function F, intent T1 at L1 is correlated to T2 at L2 */
correlatedIntent(F,T1 ,L1 ,T2 ,L2 )

:- hasIntent(F, T1 , L1 ) & hasIntent(F, T2 , L2 ) &
correlated(L1 ,L2 )

Figure 4.4.: Datalog rules for intent propagation and correlations

91

□

// in method zjReceiver.onReceive() F1

Intent intent = new Intent("android.intent.action.RUN");

□
L startService(intent);

---□

L1 intent.setClass(context, zjService.class Y );

□

F3 (X )
I
I
I

.,..

□

// in class zjService Y

□

public void onStart(Intent intent, int i) F2 { . . . }

Figure 4.5.: ICC call chain example in app GoldDream.

defned at L1 and used at L2 . To generate the atom relation, we leverage the SSA form and
the points-to analysis. The analysis is conservative. If we are not sure X must be re-defned
along the path, we assume the path is defnition free. The paths we are considering include
both intra- and inter-procedural paths.
Android apps are component based. Generally, there are four types of basic components: Activity, Service, Broadcast Receiver and Content Provider. Activity component is
for a single UI screen. Service component is for long-running operations in the background
(without any UI). Broadcast receiver responds to system-wide broadcast announcements.
Content provider is used for application data management [83]. Inter-Component Communication (ICC) is used to deliver data between components, which is similar to traditional
function invocations. We have to model such communication as a function may transitively
invoke API functions with intent of interest through ICC. However, the calling convention
of ICC is so unique that the underlying WALA infrastructure cannot recognize ICC invocations. Figure 4.5 shows an example from a real world app GoldDream. Inside the
zjReceiver.onReceive() function, there is an ICC call to the onStart() function of the zjService component. Observe that the invocation is performed by creating an Android Intent object1 , which can be considered as a request that gets sent to
1 Intent

is a standard class in Android. We call it Android Intent in order to distinguish with the intents we
associate with API functions.
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other components to perform certain actions. The target component is set by explicitly
calling setClass() of the Android Intent object. The request is sent by calling startService() with the Android Intent object. The Android runtime properly forwards the
request to the onStart() function of the zjService component.
To capture such call relation, we introduce the componentEntry(X ,F) atom with X a
subclass of Service, Activity or BroadcastReceiver. The entry point F denotes onCreate(), onStart(), and onReceive(), which are also called lifecycle
methods by Android developers. We introduce atom iccInvoke(F1 ,F2 ,L) with F2 denoting
special ICC functions, such as startActivity(), startService() and sendBroadcast(). The second inference rule of the invoke(F1 , F2 ,L) relation describes how
we model ICC as a kind of function invocation. Let’s use the example in Figure 4.5 to
illustrate the rule. It allows us capture the call chain zjReceiver.onReceive() →
startService() → zjService. onStart(). Labels
Figure 4.5 correspond to those in the second invoke() rule.

,
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, and

□□□ □
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Atom directInvoke(F1 ,F2 ,L) denotes regular function calls including virtual calls, leveraging WALA. Atom indirectInvoke(F1 ,F2 ) denotes another special kind of function invocations in Android apps, namely, implicit calls in thread execution and event handling.
A typical indirect call is a thread-related invocation, e.g., the actual call destination of
Thread.start() is the run() method of the corresponding class. The function call
f.execute() → doInBackground() in Figure 4.1 (i.e., line 5 → line 11) is an
example for event handling indirect invocation. We detect these implicit calls through predefned patterns.
Relation hasIntent(F,T ,L) denotes function F is tagged with an intent T initiated by the
API call at program point L. For example, in Figure 4.1, we can infer the following:
hasIntent ( F = StartPageActivity.onClick(),
T = SendSms,
23 /*sm.sendTextMessage(...)*/ ) = T RUE.
Observe that the frst hasIntent() rule tags the enclosing function of an API call. The
second rule propagates a tag from a callee to the caller. Note that a function may have
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multiple intents. These intents may be of the same type (but initiated at different API call
locations).
The remaining relations and rules are for intent correlations. Relation correlated(L1 ,L2 )
determines if two program points L1 and L2 are correlated. Correlation can be induced by
defnition-use, use-use, and control dependence relations, described by relations defUse(),
useUse(), and controlDep(), respectively. The fourth correlated() rule suggests that the
relation is transitive.
The frst rule of defUse(L1 ,L2 ) is standard. In our implementation, we leverage SSA
form to derive defnition-use relation for local and global variables. We leverage pointsto relation to reason about defnition-use relation for object felds. The second rule is
to capture defnition-use relation by parameter passing, including those through Android
specifc calling conventions. The basic idea is that we consider a formal argument Y used
inside the callee at L2 is defned at the call site L1 (in the caller) if it is not re-defned along
the path from the callee entry to the use site.
The relation useUse(L1 ,L2 ) denotes that there are uses at L1 and L2 coming from the
same defnition point. For example, L1 and L2 could be the two uses of the same variable
in the two branches of a predicate. Considering use-use relation in the correlated() relation is the key difference from standard program dependence analysis that considers only
defnition-use and control dependence relations.
Computation of controlDep(L1,L2 ) is standard except that it also models inter-procedural
control dependence. Particularly, all statements in a callee have control dependence with a
predicate in the caller that guards the call site.
Finally, the relation correlatedIntent(F,T1 ,L1 ,T2 ,L2 ) denotes if two intents T1 and T2 at
function F are correlated.
Example. Figure 4.6 shows a correlation analysis example in app Shanghai 1930. ContentResolver.insert() at line 16 stores the sent text message into the mail box and
it hence has intent type SmsNotify. It is determined to be correlated to the SMS sending
operation with SendSms intent at line 8. According to the defnition-use graph in Figure 4.6(b), line 16 is correlated with line 11 (both use cv defned at line 10) by the useUse()
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1 // in class PaySmsActivity
2 void a (String v8, String v9, String v10) {
3

SmsManager sm = SmsManager.getDefault();

4

ArrayList al = SmsManager.divideMessage(v10);

5

Iterator<String> ite = al.iterator();

6

while (ite.hasNext()) {

7

String s = ite.next();

8

sm.sendTextMessage(v8,v9,s,null,null);

9

}

10

ContentValues cv = new ContentValues();

11

cv.put("address",v8);

12

cv.put("body",v10);

13

cv.put("type",2);

14

ContentResolver cr = getContentResolver();

15

Uri uri = Uri.parse("content://sms");

16

cr.insert(uri,cv);

17 }
(a) Code snippet.
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L2
cv

v8

cv

L11

cv
v10
L12
L16

v10

correlated

v8

L4
al
L5
ite
L6
s
L8

(b) Part of defnition-use relations. Solid arrows labeled with variable names indicate
def-use relation.

Figure 4.6.: Intent correlation example in app Shanghai 1930.
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rules. Line 11 is further correlated with line 8 because of variables v8, again by the
useUse() rules. Hence, we have correlatedIntent(PaySmsActivity.a(), SendSms,
8, SmsNotify, 16)=T RUE. Intuitively, the two intents are correlated because the same content is being sent over a short message and written to the mail box. Thus, the message send
is not stealthy.

4.3.2 UI Compatibility Check
After intents are propagated to top level functions, the next step is to check their compatibility with the text of the corresponding user interface artifacts.
Acquiring User Interface Text. Given a top level function, we need to frst extract the
corresponding text. User interface components in an Android app are organized in a view
tree. A view is an object that renders the screen that the user can interact with. Views can
be organized as a tree to refect the layout of interface. There are two ways to construct the
layout: (1) statically through an XML resource fle; (2) dynamically by constructing the
view tree at runtime.
With the static layout construction, upon the creation of an activity, the corresponding
user interface is instantiated by associating the activity with the corresponding XML fle
by calling setContentView([XML layout id]). The Android core renders the interface accordingly. A UI object has a unique ID. The ID is often specifed in the XML
fle. Inside the app code, the handle to a UI object is acquired by calling findViewById([object id]). For example, the following text defnes a button in the XML fle.
Note that the button text is also specifed.
1
2

<Button android:id="@+id/my_button"...
android:text="@string/my_button_text"/>

Its handle can be acquired as follows. Note that the lookup id matches with that in the
XML fle.
1

Button btn = (Button)findViewById(R.id.my_button);
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The event handler for an UI object is registered as a listener. For example, one can set
the listener class for the previous button by making the following call.
1

btn.setOnClickListener(new MyListener(...));

In this case, the onClick() method of the MyListener class becomes the top level
user interaction function associated with the button. Next we describe how we extract text
for different kinds of functions.
For a top level interactive function F (e.g. onClick()), AsDroid identifes the corresponding UI text as follows. It frst identifes the registration point of the listener class
of F. From the point, AsDroid acquires the UI object handle, whose ID can be acquired
by fnding the corresponding findViewById() function. The ID is then used to scan
the layout XML fle to extract the corresponding text. AsDroid also extracts the text in
the parent layout. For example, the parent layout of a button may be a dialog. Important
information may be displayed in the dialog and the button may have only some simple text
such as “OK”. We currently cannot handle cases in which the text is dynamically generated.
We found such cases are relatively rare.
Some non-interactive top level functions also have associated UIs, for instance, the
lifecycle methods onCreate() and onStart() of activity components. These methods are invoked when the screen of an activity is frst displayed. While no user interactions
are allowed when executing these methods, the displayed screen may have enough information to indicate the expected behavior of these methods, such as loading data from a
remote server. Hence, for an activity lifecycle method, AsDroid extracts the text in the
XML layout fle associated with the activity.
Text Analysis. Once we have the text, we build a dictionary that associates a type of intent
to a set of keywords through training. We use half of the apps from the benign sources2
as the training subjects, which account for about 28% of all the apps we study. During
evaluation, we use the dictionary generated from the 28% apps to scan over the entire
set of apps. Here, we assume the training apps are mostly benign. If an intent appears
2 We

collect apps from both benign and malicious sources as shown in Section 4.4.
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Algorithm 3 Generating Keyword Cover Set.
train(S, F)

1: KWD=f /*the keyword cover set*/
2: while F =
6 f do
3:
sort S by keyword (or keyword pair) frequency
4:
k=the top ranked keyword (or pair) in S
5:
X= the functions in which k occurs
6:
KWD=KWD ∪ k
7:
F= F-X
8:
S=S-{all the keywords (pairs) in X}
9: end while

together with some text in a benign case, then the intent and the text are compatible. We
use keywords to represent text, and build compatible keyword cover set for each intent. In
particular, For each intent type T of interest, we identify all the top level functions F that
have T annotated and collect their corresponding texts. We then use Stanford Parser [84] to
parse the text to keywords. We populate a universal set S to include all individual keywords
and keyword pairs that appear in these functions.

We then use Algorithm 3 to identify

the smallest set of keywords (or pairs) that have the highest frequency and cover all the top
level functions tagged with T.
The algorithm is similar to the greedy set cover algorithm [85]. It picks the most frequently occurring keyword k at a time and adds it to the keyword set. Then it removes
all the keywords that appear in the top level functions in which k occurs, as they can be
covered by k. It repeats until the set of functions are covered.
We consider keyword pairs are semantically more predictive. Hence, we frst apply
the algorithm to keyword pairs and keep the pairs that can uniquely cover at least 10% of
functions. Then we apply the algorithm to singleton keywords on the remaining functions.
Figure 4.7 shows the generated keyword cover set for the Send-Sms intent. Observe
some keywords are semantically related to the intent but some are not, e.g. “OK” and
“Register”, which occur rarely but do uniquely cover some functions. Further inspection
shows that it is due to the malwares in the training pool. Hence, we also use human semantic
analysis to prune the keyword set, e.g. fltering out “OK” and “Register”. The keyword
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Figure 4.7.: The keyword cover set for the SendSms intent. The y-axis denotes the percentage of top level functions that can be uniquely covered by a keyword (pair).

set of HttpAccess is similarly constructed, containing keywords “Download”, “Login”,
“Load”, “Register”, and so on. The cover set of PhoneCall is much simpler, containing
only one keyword “Call”.
Once we get the keyword cover set, we further populate it with its synonyms, using
Chinese WordNet [86] to have the fnal dictionary.
Compatibility Check. The compatibility check is performed as follows.
• Given a top level function F with UI text S and an intent T, if S is incompatible with
T and all the intents correlated with T, it is considered a mismatch. Note that we
consider empty text is incompatible with any intent.
• If T is a SendSms intent and has a correlated SmsNotify intent. It is not a mismatch
regardless of the UI text.
• If T is HttpAccess, the technique checks if the corresponding UI text is compatible.
If not, it further checks if T is correlated to any UiOperation intent. If not, the intent
is consider stealthy. Intuitively, it suggests that even an HTTP access is not explicit
from the GUI text, if the data acquired through the HTTP connection are used in
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Table 4.1.: Experiment results.
HTTP
#App #Intent

#Rep

(#App) (#App)

SMS
#FP/#FN
(#App)

#Intent

CALL

INSTALL

#Rep #FP/#FN #Intent #Rep #FP/#FN #Intent #Rep #FP/#FN #Intent

(#App) (#App) (#App) (#App) (#App) (#App) (#App) (#App) (#App)

Contagio

96

189(69) 136(64) 28/7(14/2) 90(57) 86(55)

0

4(4)

2(2)

0

4(2)

4(2)

Google Play

12

Wandoujia

74

2/0(1/0)

2(1)

0

0

0

0

0

166(39) 70(23) 23/5(10/1) 46(24) 13(10) 3/2(2/2)

8(5)

0

0

0

0

0

Total

182 374(117) 218(94) 54/12(26/3) 142(86) 105(70) 5/2(3/2) 14(10)

2(2)

0

4(2)

4(2)

19(9)

12(7)

3/0(2/0)

6(5)

6(5)

I

(#App)

#Rep

I

(#App)

#FP/#FN

I

(#App)

0/7(0/6) 287(82) 228(77) 28/14(14/8)
27(10)

I

220(47)

18(8)

I

83(28)

5/0(3/0)

I

26/7(11/3)

0/7(0/6) 534(139) 329(113) 59/21(28/11)

some UI component (e.g. fetching and then displaying advertisements from a remote
server), the HTTP access is not considered stealthy.

4.4 Evaluation
We implement a prototype called AsDroid (Anti-Stealth Droid). We transform the DEX
fle of an app to a JAR fle with dex2jar [87] and then use WALA [28] as the analysis engine.
Our implementation is mainly on top of WALA.
We have collected apps from three different sources. We aim to detect those with the
following stealthy behavior: SMS sends, phone calls, HTTP connections and component
installations. Hence, we only focus on those having the permissions for such behaviors.
Particularly, since almost all apps have the HTTP permission, we select those that have
at least one of the other three permissions. Note that despite we introduce six intents
in Section 4.3, SmsNotify and UiOperation do not describe stealthy behavior but rather
suppress false alarms. The 3 sources are the following.
⋄ Contagio Mini Dump [88]. It collects a large pool of (potential) malware reported
by users and existing security tools. These malicious apps may perform stealthy operations, leak user private information, or compromise the operating system like a rootkit. We
acquired 96 apps holding the needed permissions.
⋄ Google Play [89]. This is the offcial apps market holding a lot of Android games.
We checked the top 180 free game apps and only 12 of them satisfy our selection criteria.

100
⋄ Wandoujia [90]. This is a popular general Android app market in China. We have
checked the 1000 most popular game apps on the market and downloaded 74 of them with
the needed permissions.
The detection results are shown in Table 4.1. In the table, #App in the second column
denotes the number of tested apps from a specifc source. #Intent is the number of API
invocations with one of the four kinds of potential stealthy intents. #Rep is the number
of intent points reported by AsDroid as stealthy. #FP is the number of false positives and
#FN is the number of false negatives. The corresponding #App in parentheses denotes the

number of apps in which these intents appear. Note that one app may have multiple intents.
The last three columns show the total numbers. #App in the last three columns is not the
simple sum of the #App in the corresponding preceding columns. For example, the number
of total reported apps is 77 for the Contagio source. It is not the sum of the reported
apps in the four categories as one app may be reported in multiple categories. We make the
following observations.
• AsDroid is able to detect a lot of stealthy behaviors in these apps. Totally, AsDroid
detects that 113 apps perform stealthy operations, with 85 true positives, i.e. having
at least one true stealthy API call. Note that there are some apps that do not have the
intents (i.e. API calls) of interest even though they hold the permissions. Since there
are no existing oracles to determine stealthy behavior, we identify true positives by
manually inspecting the results in two ways. For those API calls that can be reached
by testing, we determine their stealthiness by executing the apps. Many of the API
calls are diffcult to reach without a complex sequence of user actions. Since we
lack automatic test generation support, we perform code inspection instead. AsDroid
detects a lot of stealthy behavior in the apps from Contagio, which is supposed
to be a source hosting (highly likely) malwares. Most of the detected stealthy SMS
sends and phone calls may cause unexpected charges. Most of the stealthy HTTP
accesses are to notify the remote servers the status of device or the app (e.g. a mobile
device becomes online). Some of them also leak critical user information.

101
• AsDroid produces some false positives (28 out of the 113 reported apps). They are
induced by the following reasons: (1) AsDroid cannot analyze dynamically generated text associated with a UI component; (2) The dictionary we use is incomplete;
(3) Some reported intents are along infeasible paths but AsDroid does not reason
about path feasibility. The detection outcome for individual apps is denoted by the
symbols on top of the bars and their colors in Figure 4.9. Also observe that most
false positives belong to the category of HTTP accesses. Some of them are due to
the incompleteness of our keyword dictionary. However most of them are essentially
HTTP accesses in advertisement libraries. These accesses often download advertisement materials and store them to external fles that are later read and displayed.
Ideally, they are not stealthy as the materials are displayed. However AsDroid currently cannot reason about correlations through external resources, leading to false
positives. Note that most existing static data fow analysis engines on Android have
the same limitation. It should be easy to have an additional post-processing phase to
suppress warnings from advertisement libraries.
• The number of false negatives is small (11 apps total). We manually inspect the apps
that are not reported by AsDroid to determine false negatives. In particular, we use
WALA to report all the API calls of interest and then we inspect them one by one
manually. There are 182−113=69 such apps. We found that AsDroid missed 11
malicious apps. Most of them are in the category of stealthy install. As such, the
detection rate of AsDroid is 85/(85+11)=88%. The main reason for false negatives
is that the current implementation cannot model some of the implicit call edges.
There are also cases that native libraries are used to perform stealthy behavior, which
is not handled by AsDroid. The false negative HTTP accesses mainly result from
the in-accuracy of the text analysis. While AsDroid extracted keywords such as
“download” and “login” that make the (stealthy) HTTP accesses compatible and
thus not being reported, these accesses doesn’t match the textual semantics.
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9.56% 1.21%

39.43%

■ onClick()
■ activity

lifecycle methods

■ onReceive()
■ others

49.80%
Figure 4.8.: Breakdown of the top level functions with intents. Activity lifecycle methods
include onCreate() and onStart() of an activity. onReceive() and the other
categories do not have associated UI.

• Stealthy HTTP connections are very common, although many of them may not be
as harmful as the other stealthy behaviors (please refer to our case study). SMS
sends are another dominant category of stealthy behaviors, which echoes the recent
studies [19, 76].
Comparison with FlowDroid. FlowDroid [35, 36] is a state-of-the-art open-source static
taint analysis for Android apps. We ran it on the 96 apps from Contagio. We use the
default taint sources (e.g. methods retrieving private information). For the taint sinks, we
only keep the SMS send and HTTP access methods. FlowDroid ran out of memory for 55
of the apps hence we compare the results for the remaining 41. FlowDroid reports 4 SMS
sends in 3 apps and 1 HTTP access in 1 app that have information leak. In contrast, in
the 41 apps, AsDroid reports 26 stealthy HTTP connections in 18 apps, including the one
reported by FlowDroid, with 1 false positive in 1 app and 7 false negatives in 2 apps. It also
reports 35 SMS sends in 21 apps, including 2 SMS sends reported by FlowDroid. For the
other 2 SMS sends (by FlowDroid), the UIs explicitly indicate the behavior. Hence they
are not stealthy although they do leak information. From the comparison, we clearly see
that FlowDroid and AsDroid focus on problems with different natures. All experiments are
performed on an Intel Core i7 3.4GHz machine with 12GB memory. The OS is Ubuntu
12.04.
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Figure 4.9.: Analysis time. The detection results are also annotated on top of each bar with
‘@’ denoting true positive(red), ‘X’ false positive(black) and ‘N’ false negative( yellow).
Since an app may have multiple intents, it may be annotated with multiple labels. The last
3 apps exceeded the max timeout 30 mins.
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Figure 4.8 shows the breakdown of the top level functions that are attributed with intents. There are totally 743 such functions. Observe that 39% of such functions are the
interactive onClick() function and almost 50% of them are activity lifecycle methods
that are not interactive but nonetheless have associated UI. About 10% of them are onReceive() of external events and 1.2% of other functions such as the timer handler function
TimerTask.run(). These functions are often not associated with any UI.
We present the analysis time for the 182 apps in Figure 4.9. Most apps (about 93%) can
be detected in 3 mins and a few in 13 mins. Three apps require more than 30 mins. Human
inspection disclosed that that they are very complex apps such that AsDroid consumes
exceptionally large amount of memory, which slows down the analysis signifcantly. We
plan to further look into this issue.

4.4.1 Case Studies
Next, we present two more cases.
iCalendar is a calendar app infected by malicious code that sends a SMS message subscribing to a premium-rate service. The malicious operation is triggered by user interaction
in a stealthy way. The user clicks the app to change a background image and the app increases a counter. When the counter gets to 5, a message is sent. Figure 4.10 shows a
simplifed code snippet of the process.
Variable main represents the main interface layout. As soon as the app is launched, it
registers a click listener in onCreate(). When the user clicks the interface, showImg()
is invoked in onClick() to reset the background image. In the mean time, the app checks
the counter to see if sendSms() should be called to send a premium-rate SMS.
In our analysis, two intents: UiOperation and SendSms, are associated with

□
L1

and

□
L2

in Figure 4.10 respectively. The intents are propagated to the top level function onClick()
through the call graph. The UI component associated with the function is the background
image without any text, which does not imply the SendSms indent. The correlation analysis also determines that these two intents are not correlated. It is hence reported as a
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1 // in class {iCalendar}
2 public void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {
3

main.setOnClickListener(this);

4 }
5 public void onClick(View view) {
6

showImg();

7 }
8 private void showImg() {
9

if(index == 5) {

10

sendSms();

11

}

12

main.setBackgroundDrawable(drawable1); L1

□

13 }
14 public void sendSms() {
15

smsmanager.sendTextMessage("106xxxx", null, "921X1", null,

□

null); L2
16 }

Figure 4.10.: Code example in app iCalendar.

mismatch. Note that taint analysis tools [1, 35, 36] cannot report the problem because the
data involved in the SMS send are hardcoded.
HitPP is a game app downloaded from Google Play. Figure 4.11 shows the code snippet
in which a stealthy HTTP access is made when the app is initialized. The initialization at
line 4 transitively starts a thread at line 14. The thread entry is at line 18. The thread starts
an HTTP connection at line 21 and then shuts it off right after at line 22. The app does
not receive or display any data from the remote server. We suspect the HTTP access is to
inform the remote server about the start of the app. Since there is no UI text associated with
the top level onCreate() method and there are no correlated intents, the HTTP access

106

1 public class HitPP extends Activity {
2

public void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {

3

// {initialization} ...

4

WiGame.init(this, "f11947a...", "Df6mBy...", true, true);

5

}

6 }
7 class WiGame {
8

public static void init(Context ctx, String s1, String s2,
boolean x, boolean y) {

9
10

b.a(ctx,s1);
}

11 }
12 class b {
13

public static void a(Context ctx, String str) {

14

(new b$1(str, ctx)).start();//→b$1.run() at line 18

15 }
16 }
17 class b$1 extends Thread {
18

public void run() {

19

String str = "http://d.wiXXX.com/was/r?u=" +
WiGame.getDeviceId();

20

HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(str); //HttpAccess

21

httpClient.execute(httpGet); //without a LHS variable

22

httpClient.getConnectionManager().shutdown();

23 }
24 }

Figure 4.11.: Code example in app HitPP.
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is reported by AsDroid. This is a very typical kind of stealthy HTTP access reported by
AsDroid.

4.5 Limitations
AsDroid has the following limitations. (1) The current UI analysis is simply based on
textual keywords, which may be insuffcient. It is possible that apps use images or obfuscated texts (e.g. text containing keyword “send” but having no relation with sending a
message). AsDroid will have diffculty in catching the intention of the UI. We will study
applying more advanced text analysis or image analysis. (2) Currently, to avoid false positives, AsDroid relies on certain rules in detecting intent correlation and avoids reporting
some intents incompatible with UI if their correlated intents are compatible. This seems to
be working fne given that Android malwares are still in their early stage. In the future, if
an adversary has the prior knowledge of AsDroid, he could obfuscate a malicious app to
induce bogus correlations to avoid being reported. We envision a more sophisticated program analysis component will be needed, which may leverage testing or symbolic analysis
(e.g. use symbolic analysis to determine if two intents are truely correlated). (3) AsDroid
currently cannot reason about correlations through external resources, leading to false positives. Note that most existing static data fow analysis engines on Android have the same
limitation. It could be mitigated by modeling external accesses. (4) Currently, AsDroid
does not support native code or refection. (5) AsDroid misses some Inter-Component
Communication correlations. We could leverage Epicc [91] to get better coverage in our
future work.

4.6 Related Work
TaintDroid applies dynamic taint analysis to Android apps [1] to prevent information
leak. Gilbert et al. extended the technique to track implicit fows [92]. Hornyack et al.
developed AppFench to impose privacy control on Android applications [38]. Arzt et al.
investigated the limitations of using runtime monitoring for securing Android apps [93].
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They used unintended SMS sending as an example. The essence of the technique is information fow tracking. FlowDroid [35, 36] is a very recent static taint analysis tool. These
techniques cannot detect stealthy behavior as such operations may not leak information, as
evidenced by the comparison with FlowDroid in Section 4.4.
Enck et al. developed a simple static analysis [2] that can detect SMS sends with
hardcoded SMS numbers and phone calls, such as prefx “tel:” and substring “900”.
However, these patterns are very limited and not all such operations are malicious.
Elish et al. proposed to detect malicious Android apps [94] by determining the absence
of data dependence path between user input/action and a sensitive function. However,
dependence is not the key characteristic of stealthy behavior. In our experience, SMS sends
triggered by user inputs can be malicious. Furthermore, many benign HTTP accesses are
not triggered by any user action, e.g. an email app might connect to the server frequently
to check new emails in background.
DroidRanger developed by Zhou et al. employs both static and dynamic techniques to
detect malware [95], based on signatures derived from known malware such as premiumrate numbers and content of SMS messages. Hence, Droid-Ranger has to maintain a signature database that may change signifcantly overtime. And it also has runtime overhead.
Some existing work tries to capture Android GUI errors [96] or improve privacy control
via GUI testing [97]. Gross et al. developed EXSYST [98] that uses search based testing to
improve GUI testing coverage. Mirzaei et al. applied symbolic execution to generate test
cases for Android apps [99, 100]. AsDroid could potentially leverage these techniques to
generate test cases for bug report validation.
Recently, Pandita et al. proposed W HYPER to analyze an app’s text description and
then determine if the app should be granted certain permissions [7]. Both W HYPER and
AsDroid leverage text analysis. However, they have different goals and AsDroid works by
analyzing both apps and UIs.
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4.7 Summary
We propose AsDroid, a technique to detect stealthy malicious behavior in Android apps.
The key idea is to identify contradiction between program behavior and user interface text.
We associate intents to a set of API’s of interest. We then propagate these intents through
call graphs and eventually attribute them to top level functions that usually have associated
UIs. By checking the compatibility between the intents and the text of the UI artifacts, we
can detect stealthy operations. We test AsDroid on 182 apps that are potentially problematic
by looking at their permissions. AsDroid reports 113 apps that have stealthy behaviors,
with 28 false positives and 11 false negatives.
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5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation focuses on the topics of static analysis for Android apps. We frst examined accurately discovering more sensitive data sources in Android apps. While existing researches focused on sensitive data disclosure detection with predefned data sources
that are normally API functions, we proposed techniques to identify sensitive data sources
among the generic API functions which may not generate sensitive data in many cases.
Such generic API functions include reading data from user interface, fles, network, etc.
We leveraged text analysis to discover the sensitiveness. Then we applied bi-directional
propagation to detect sensitive data disclosure issues. We also developed a technique to
detect stealthy behaviors combining with text analysis and bi-directional propagation.
Detecting Sensitive User Inputs Disclosures. User inputs are very common in Android
apps and many of them may contain sensitive information, e.g., credit card number, birth
date. Existing approaches of detecting sensitive data disclosures always focus on tracking
the data generated by certain specifc API functions. Such API functions directly returns
sensitive data. The user input is a typical type of generic API functions that can return
either sensitive data or insensitive data, depending on the context. However, existing work
mostly neglect such data sources.
We develop SUPOR to detect the sensitiveness of the user inputs by inspecting the
statically defned attributes and correlated text labels of the input felds. We mimic as
real users to associate the input felds with correlated text labels and bind the discovered
sensitive user input with corresponding API invocations in the code for further analysis.
We evaluate our technique on a large number of real-world Android apps. The results show
that it can effectively and effciently identify sensitive user inputs and then detect their
disclosures.
Detecting Even More Sensitive Data Disclosures. Besides the API functions for obtaining user inputs, there are more other generic API functions that can read data from fles,
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network and other resources. Different with the user inputs that can be determined to be
sensitive or not by examining the context of the user interfaces, we cannot easily determine
the sensitiveness of those API functions by checking where they are used. If we ignore all
such APIs, we may miss a lot of real problems when detecting sensitive data disclosures.
But if we treat all such API functions as sensitive data sources, we can expect a lot of false
warnings.
We develop type system based technique to decide whether a variable storing the data
may hold sensitive information. We associate the variables with correlated text labels in the
apps, either from the user interface or from the code. The text labels are treated as the types
of the variables. Text analysis can then be applied to determine whether the associated text
labels indicate the sensitiveness of the corresponding data. In case that the sensitiveness of
a piece of data is discovered after the data falls into a sink point that discloses data to public
channels, we allow the types to be propagated bi-directionally. While traditional techniques
of sensitive data disclosure detection requires forward data fow paths from data sources to
sinks, our technique is able to handle the cases in which backward paths exist from where
we recognize the data sensitiveness to the sinks. We develop a prototype B ID T EXT and
evaluate it on 10,000 Android apps. The results show the effectiveness and effciency of
our approach.
Detecting Stealthy Behaviors. Stealthy behaviors are the kind of behaviors that are executed without the users’ consent. For example, malware may send a short message to a
premium number in the background or make a phone call in the mid-night without any user
actions. This kind of malicious behaviors cannot be easily distinguished from the benign
ones because the benign ones perform the actions with the same API functions. Some existing techniques leverage the blacklist to identify malicious stealthy behaviors. For instance,
if an SMS sending API function sends a message to a blacklisted number, it is reported
as a stealthy behavior. But maintaining a blacklist is non-trivial and thus we need a more
general approach to detect such behaviors.
We model stealthy behavior as the program behavior that mismatches with the user interface, which denotes the user expectation of program behavior. We assign an intent to
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each API function that indicates a specifc behavior and propagate it backwardly to top
level functions. A top level function may be a user interaction function with the behavior
it performs. Then we extract the corresponding text from the user interface and examine
whether the text information indicates the discovered program behaviors. Semantic mismatch of the two indicates stealthy behaviors. We develop AsDroid and evaluate it on a
pool of Android apps that are potentially problematic. The results show that AsDroid is
able to detect stealthy behaviors with low false positives and false negatives.
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